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Tracing
Peter B. Oh
Tacing is a method that appears within multiple fields oflaw Distinct conceptions of
tracing,however have arisenindependently within securtiesandremediallaw.Inthe securities
context,plaintiffsmust 'race"their securtiesto a specific offering to pursue certainreliefunder
the SecuritiesAct of 1933. In the remedialcontex; victims who "tace" theirmisappropriated
value into a wrongdoershands can claim any dervative value, even ifithas appreciated
This Article is the First to compare and then cross-apply t-acing within these two
contexts. Specifically thisArticleargues thatsecuritieslaw shouldadopta version of the 'r'ulesbased tiacing"methodfrom remedial law This metods tracingof exchanged value,insteadof
purchasedsecurities, will restore broadaccess to private civil remediesand the optimallevel of
deterrencefor fraudulentpublicofferings.

I.
II.

III.

849
INTRODUCTION ..................................................
858
METHODOLOGY .................................................
860
TRACING SECURITIES ..............................................

861
The SecutiesAct of 1933 ...................................
865
The Book-Entry System ....................................
870
DoctrinalMethods........................................
876
REMEDIAL TRACING ..............................................
877
A. EquitableandLegalFonnulations..............................
881
B. Rules-Based Tracing......................................
884
C DoctrinalMethods........................................
887
INTRADISCIPLNARY TRACING ........................................
A.
B.
C

IV

V

A.
B.

888
Re-Tracing.................................................
892
TracingMultiple Offerings......................................

C

896
Value EqualsAccess EqualsDelivery............................

898
VI. C ONCLUSION ...................................................
I.

INTRODUCTION

As part of a broader initiative integrating statutory disclosure
requirements,' the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has
Assistant Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. B.A. 1994, Yale
*
College; J.D. 1997, University of Chicago. E-mail: poh@wmitchell.edu. This Article has
benefited from a faculty workshop at the University of Iowa College of Law. I thank Steven
A. Bank, Barbara Ann Banoff, Randall P. Bezanson, Arthur E. Bonfield, Russell L.
Christopher, Raleigh Hannah Levine, Daniel S. Monk, Gregory Mitchell, Richard W
Murphy, Hillary A. Sale, Niels B. Schaumann, and Tung Yin for their comments and
suggestions at various stages of this project.
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implemented an "access equals delivery" model for prospectuses!
The model relieves certain issuers of their existing obligations to print
and deliver a final prospectus to investors prior to or contemporaneous
with the sale of a security;3 such issuers merely have to file the final
prospectus with a timely registration statement.4 This streamlined
requirement presumes that investors have access to any filings
available on the Internet.5 Accordingly, posting filings on a Web site

constructively effects delivery.
There are consequences to subsuming delivery obligations within
the rubric of presumed access. On the one hand, the "access equals
delivery" regime would eliminate simultaneous delivery of the final
1.
See, e.g., Securities Offering Reform, 69 Fed. Reg. 67,392, 67,393 & n.15
(proposed Nov. 17, 2004) (to be codified at 40 CER. pts. 228-230, 239-240, 243, and 274)
("The 1998 proposals [that unsuccessfully attempted to modernize the securities offering
process] were a step in an evaluation of the offering process under the Securities Act [of
1933] that began as far back as 1966 ...)'(referencing the Regulation of Securities
Offerings, 63 Fed. Reg. 67,174 (proposed Dec. 4, 1998), and citing Milton H. Cohen, "Truth
in Securities"Revisited 79 HARV. L. REv. 1340, 1342 (1966) ("[I]t is my plea that there now
be created a new coordinated disclosure system having as its basis the continuous disclosure
system of the 1934 Act and treating '1933 Act' disclosure needs on this foundation-"))).
2.
See Securities Offering Reform, Release Nos. 33-8591, 34-52056, 70 Fed. Reg.
44,722 (Aug. 3, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/finalU33-8591.pdf. The SEC
first proposed a version of this model in 2000. See Use of Electronic Media, 17 C.ER.
§§ 231, 241, 271 (May 4, 2000); see also infianote 5 and accompanying text.
3.
These relaxed obligations would be available only to "well-known seasoned
issuers," and their majority-owned subsidiaries, that must have at least $700 million of
outstanding common equity or $1 billion of registered debt securities. Securities Offering
Reform, 69 Fed. Reg. at 67,396 (stating that a "well-known seasoned issuer" is characterized
by having "more regular dialogue with investors and market participants through the press
and other media" as well as its communications being "subject to scrutiny by investors, the
financial press, analysis, and others who evaluate disclosure when it is made").
4.
Id.at 67,438-39.
5.
Id at 67,438 ("Under an 'access equals delivery' model, investors are presumed
to have access to the Internet ....The access concept is premised on the information or
filings being readily available."). One immediate concern with this presumption is that a
sizable segment of the public still do not have access to the Internet. See, e.g., Spencer
Overton, The Donor Class: Campaign Finance,Democracy,andParticipation,153 U. PA. L.
REV. 73, 110 (2004) ("Currently, nearly one-quarter of Americans remain 'offline."'). Indeed,
the SEC cited this lack of access as a reason as recently as 2000 for withdrawing an earlier
version of "access equals delivery." See, e.g.,
Michael A. Perino, Introductionto Symposium,
SecurntiesLaw for the Next Miflennium: A Forward-LookingStatement, 75 ST. JOHN'S L.
RE. 1, 5 n. 17 (2001) ("The SEC concluded that such an 'access-equals-delivery' model was
inappropriate at this time because of concerns that electronic media was not 'universally
accessible and accepted' by investors." (quoting Use of Electronic Media, Exchange Act
Release No. 42,728, [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,304, at 83,388,
83,390 (Apr. 28, 2000))). This is not to say that such individuals do not have Internet access
through public libraries or institutional investment opportunities that do fit the presumption of
access. For a more detailed analysis of this presumption of access, see Anita Indira Anand,
The Efficiency of Direct Public Offerings, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 433, 438-54
(2003).
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prospectus and a confirmation of sale,6 arguably clarifying the function
of a confirmation and expediting sales of some securities. On the
other hand, delivery of the final prospectus after the sale of a security
reassures investors that their purchase is part of a registered transaction
in a way that presumed access cannot.7 Recognizing the value of such
reassurance, the SEC's rule requires parties effecting sale of a security
to send investors a notification, instead of a final prospectus,
confirming that the transaction is connected to a registration
statement!
Providing reassurance, however, was not the original rationale for
the notification provision. In unveiling its "access equals delivery"
model, the SEC announced: "[T]o preserve an investorS ability to
tracesecuritiesto a registeredoffering,the proposals include a separate
requirement to notify investors that they purchased securities in a
registered offering."9 Inexplicably, the SEC completely omits any such
concern over the tracing of securities. This is particularly curious
considering that the notification provision has undergone no apparent
revision from its inception.'"
Yet the omission is hardly surprising in that the ability of
investors to trace securities has been eroding over time. The Securities
Act of 1933 (Securities Act) strives to protect investors by providing
private civil remedies that deter fraudulent offerings and sales of
securities." To access these remedies, courts require proof that
6.
Securities Offering Reform, 69 Fed. Reg. at 67,438 ("Because the contract of sale
has already occurred, we ... believe that delivery of a confirmation and the delivery of the
final prospectus need not be linked.").
7.
See, e.g., id at 67,349 ("[P]rospectus delivery can serve the function of informing
investors that they purchased securities in a registered transaction.").
8.
Id Investors still would be able to request a final prospectus, but issuers would
not have to deliver it prior to settlement of the purchase. Id; see also infia Part I.B.
9.
Press Release, SEC, SEC Proposes Securities Offering Reform, Requires
RegistrationofHedge Fund Investment Advisers (Oct. 27, 2004) (emphasis added), available
athttp://www.sec.gov/news/pres/2004-150.htm.
10. Despite the comprehensive and significant nature of the SEC's "access equals
delivery" proposal, there was no Concept Release.
11.
See, e.g., Edward N. Gadsby, Historical Development of the S.E.C-The
Government View, 28 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 6, 9 (1959) ("The two principal objectives of the
1933 act were, first, to protect investors by requiring adequate and accurate disclosure
regarding securities distributed to the public in interstate commerce or by use of the mail, and,
second, to outlaw fraud in the sale of all securities whether or not newly issued."); see also
infia note 85 and accompanying text. This Article is concerned only with private civil
remedies under the Securities Act because they are exclusively subject to the tracing
requirement. Some courts and commentators have pointed plaintiffs unable to satisfy the
tracing requirement to Rule lob-5 under the Securities Exchange Act. See, e.g., Paul C.
Cumin & Christine M. Ford, The Critical Issue of Standing Under Section 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933, 6 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FrN. L. 155, 156 (2001). This is a red herring.
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communication, prospectus, or registration statement containing a
material misstatement or omission; that is, plaintiffs must "trace" their
securities back to a fraudulent public offering.'2 Courts originally
applied this tracing requirement only to section 11 of the Securities
Act,'3 which imposes strict liability on offerors and sellers directly

Courts have
involved in a fraudulent registered transaction. 4
proceeded to extend the tracing requirement to section 12(a)(2) of the
Securities Act,"5 which imposes a negligence standard on offerors and

sellers that prepare oral communications or prospectuses in a
Utilizing an aggressive
fraudulent registered transaction.'6
interpretation of the United States Supreme Court's heavily criticized
decision in Gustafson v Alloyd Co.,'" courts subsequently have applied
Rule 1Ob-5 imposes a stiffer scienter requirement and targets different defendants than
sections 11 or 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000), "4th 15
U.S.C. §§ 77k-I (2000). Pointing to Rule 1Ob-5 fails to engage the tracing requirement and its
thwarting of access to the Securities Act's private civil remedies.
12.
Tracing of securities is alternatively framed as a question of "standing." See, e.g.,
Demaria v. Andersen, 318 E3d 170, 178 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[A]ftermarket purchasers who can
trace their shares to an allegedly misleading registration statement have standing to sue under
...the 1933 Act."); Cumin & Ford, supm note 11, at 156 ("[A] plaintiff has standing even if
his or her shares are purchased in the secondary market within a certain number of days after
the offering, or are otherwise 'traceable' to the offering."). This conflates distinct terms.
Tracing concerns the factual viability of certain causes of action under the Securities Act,
whereas standing concerns the procedural propriety of certain shareholders bringing a cause
of action under the Securities Act. Accordingly, a plaintiff may raise the question of standing
at any point in litigation, whereas tracing is a merits issue that must await trial. See, e.g., In re
Lilco Sec. Litig., 111 ER.D. 663, 671 (E.D.N.Y 1986) ("[T]racing is a question of fact
reserved for trial."). Certainly standing is a threshold requirement in that prospective
plaintiffs that lack standing will not be subject to the tracing requirement; this perhaps
explains why tracing is often collapsed into an inquiry about standing. Plaintiffs with
standing, however, still might not be able to satisfy the tracing requirement. See infra notes
232-235 and accompanying text.
Moreover, reframing tracing as a question of standing invokes a vast body of literature
fraught with problems of no immediate relevance here. See, e.g., Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling
Standing,79 N.YU. L. REv. 612, 613-14 (2004) ("[V]irtually every published article on the
topic seems to argue that the law of standing is at best confusing and at worst a serious
impediment to fair and just outcomes. The doctrine, it is charged, is 'permeated with
sophistry,' a 'tool[] to further [judges'] ideological agendas,' 'wildly vacillating,' and 'a largescale conceptual mistake."' (internal citations omitted)). As this Article demonstrates, tracing
within securities law is actually a misnomer for a distinct process known as "following," a
purely mechanical exercise of locating misappropriated property. See hi-a Part II.B.
Accordingly, this Article does not use the term "standing."
13.
See, e.g.,Barnesv. Osofsky, 373 F2d 269 (2dCir. 1967); see also infrm Part I.C.
14.
15 U.S.C. § 77k (2000); see also infra Part I.A.
15.
See, e.g., In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig., 792 E Supp. 197 (E.D.N.Y 1992); see
also lnf Part I.C.
16.
15 U.S.C. § 77A2) (2000); see also infra Part II.A.
17.
513 U.S. 561 (1995); see also infa note 118 and accompanying text.
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the tracing requirement to limit section 12(a)(2)'s recissionary remedy
to only public offerings. 8 As aptly summarized by Hillary Sale, the net
Act's private
effect of these judicial interpretations is that the Securities
9
civil remedies have been "disappearing without a trace."9'
This disappearance is the by-product of securities history and
practice. During the late 1960s, the system for processing securities
trades completely collapsed during the "Paper Crunch."2' In what the
SEC described as "the most prolonged and severe crisis in the
securities industry in forty years,"' brokerage firms had become
inundated with paper stock certificates that had to be altered, recorded,
and then physically delivered to issuers for each and every trade.22
Congress responded by directing the SEC to implement an
electronically based "book-entry system" which now registers
securities in the name of a third-party nominee, or a "street name."23
The use of street names has erased from securities any vestige that they
belong to a specific purchaser or come from a particular offering.
Combined with the creation of centralized repositories," the bookentry system has transformed securities into fungible instruments."
An unintended casualty of this transformation has been the
capacity of all security holders to satisfy the tracing requirement.
Security holders must trace all of their purchases to a specific
fraudulent offering. This is because courts consistently have found
18. Regrettably, Congress has codified Gustafson through the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
19. Hillary A. Sale, DisappearingWithout a Trace: Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the
1933 SecuritiesAc4 75 WASH. L. REV. 429 (2000).
20. See infa Part I.B.
21.
STUDY OF UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES OF BROKERS AND DEALERS: REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (PURSUANT TO
SECTION 1l(h) OF THE SECURImES INVESTOR PROTECTION ACT OF 1970), H.R. Doc. No. 92notes
231, at 1 (1971) [hereinafter SEC, UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES]; see also infa

86-91 and accompanying text.
See infi notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
22.
23. See, e.g., Egon Guttman, Toward the UncertiFicatedSecurite. A Congressional
Lead for States To Follow, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 717, 720 n.17 (1980) ("Recordation of
securities in the name of a registered broker/dealer or in that of a national bank or their
respective nominees is called registration in 'street name."'); see also U.C.C. art. 8 prefatory
note (rev. 1994) ("[O]ne entity-Cede & Co.-is listed as the shareholder of record of
somewhere in the range of sixty to eighty per cent of the outstanding shares of all publicly
traded companies.").
24. The Depository Trust Company (DTC) is the nation's largest repository for
publicly traded securities. See, e.g., U.C.C. art. 8 prefatory note (rev. 1994) ("Essentially all
of the trading in publicly held companies is executed through the broker-dealers who are
participants in DTC... ");see also ina notes 103, 108, and accompanying text.
See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
25.
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anything less to be wanting,26 even a showing that ninety-seven percent
of all securities were from a fraudulent offering." When there is only
one offering of securities, a simple inference connects all purchases to
any fraud.28 But when there are multiple offerings,29 the tracing
requirement "draws arbitrary distinctions between plaintiffs based on
the remote genesis of their shares."3 Only parties that purchase
securities before they flow through the book-entry system have any
assurance of tracing successfully; this is a "narrow class of persons,"'
which includes "institutional investors, members of Congress, and
those with connections to underwriters."32 Everyone else who
purchases securities in the aftermarket must try to trace fungible
securities registered in street name back to a specific fraudulent
offering." As one court has conceded, "the modem practice of
electronic delivery and clearing of securities trades, in which all
deposited shares of the same issue are held together in fungible bulk,
makes it virtually irnpossibleto trace sharesto a registration statement
once additional unregistered shares have entered the market."3
Indeed, a commentator recently found only five instances where
security holders were even "possibly able to meet the direct-tracing
requirement."" The reason is that tracing creates a perverse incentive
to conduct multiple offerings. Provided only one of the offerings does
not involve fraud, aftermarket purchasers have little, if any, chance of
tracing fungible securities successfully. In this way, conducting
multiple offerings can utilize the tracing requirement to evade or undo
26. See, e.g., Krim v. pcOrder.com, 210 ER.D. 581, 586 (WD. Tex. 2002)
("[D]amages [must] actually [be] issued pursuant to a defective statement, not just that it
might have been, probably was, or most likely was, issued pursuant to a defective
statement.").
27. See Inre Quarterdeck Office Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. CV 92-3970, 1993 WL
6233 10, at *2-3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 1993).
28. See Inre Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 227 ER.D. 65, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
29. This includes shelf-registered securities, although there is arguably a decreased
need to protect participants in such offerings. See, e.g., Barbara Ann Banoff, Regulatory
Subsidies,EfticientMarkets,andShelfRegistration: An Analysis ofRule 415,70 VA. L. RE.
135, 176-84 (1984).
30. Inre Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 227 ER.D. at 117.
31.
Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 786 (2d Cir. 1951); see also
Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 E2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1967).
32. Sale, supra note 19, at 441. This class includes persons fortunate enough to
receive "spun" stock. See ifia note 122 and accompanying text. See generally Sean J.
Griffith, Spinning and Underpncing: A Legal and Economic Analysis of the Preferential
Allocation ofSharesin InitialPublic Offenngs, 69 BROOK. L. REv. 583 (2004).
33. See infa notes 123-124 and accompanying text.
34. Inre InitalPub.Offering Sec. Litig., 227 ER.D. at 118 (emphasis added).
35. Sale, supm note 19, at 463.
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liability under sections 11 or 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act. As
Melvyn Weiss, a prominent shareholder advocate, "bitterly" has
accused one court:
Weiss: "[Y]ou are giving them an incentive to avoid section 11
liability."
Court: "What do I do about the case law, which according to the

defense, whether it's one percent or less than one percent [of
problem occurs, the cases, they ...
nonfraudulent securities],
36 once that
uniformly say it's over."

The court proceeded to say just that, finding the securities untraceable
while discreetly noting that "it is not the domain of this Court to
abrogate" the tracing requirement." The intent of Congress, however,
could not be any clearer: to deter fraudulent offerings through the
This is where the true
Securities Act's private civil remedies."
abrogation has occurred. By strictly applying the tracing requirement,
courts have thwarted equal and meaningful access to sections 11 and
12(a)(2), and undermined their deterrence effect.
Ironically, the tracing requirement is unsatisfactory regardless of
one's view towards these provisions. Scholars that favor expanded
access to private civil remedies have observed that "[w]hat began ...
as a shield to prevent non-Offering Shareholders from proceeding with

section 11 claims has become a sword in the hands of defendants."39

Yet practitioners that support restricted access to these remedies have
contended that the "confusion and uncertainty engendered by a broad
interpretation of 'tracing' is an anathema to a coherent and predictable
federal securities regulatory scheme." '
Securities law, however, misunderstands what remedial law
already knows. Tracing originated as a remedial method." Though its
definition is far from settled, 2 tracing refers to a process of
determining when, "for certain legal purposes, one asset stands in the
' Tracing, in this context, enables a victim to seek a
place of another."43
In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 227 ER.D. at 119 n.402. The court more
36.
tactfully observed that Weiss had "noted bitterly the possible unfairness of this standard." Id.
Id.
37.
See infia note 85 and accompanying text.
38.
Sale, supra note 19, at 463-64.
39.
40. Curnin & Ford, supra note 11, at 203.
See infia Part I.A.
41.
See infa Parts IIA-B.
42.
LIONEL D. SMITH, THE LAW OF TRACING 3 (1997). Dale Oesterle defines tracing
43.
conventionally as a "restitutionary right to claim specific property ... that arises from a
property interest of the claimant in other property that another has misappropriated." Dale A.
Oesterle, Deficiencies of the Restitutionary Right to Trace MisappropriatedProperty in
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claim forcing a wrongdoer to disgorge all proceeds derived from
misappropriated value;" tracing thus embodies the ancient maxim
omnia pmesununtur contractapoliatorem,or everything is presumed
against a thief.4 In the parlance of criminal procedure, tracing regards
the wrongdoer's value as ill-gotten fruit from a poisonous tree.
The justification for remedial tracing lies at the core of
restitution. In a conventional sense, restitution provides relief from
unjust enrichment, when a party has received a legally unjustifiable
benefit at another party's expense. 46 There is also a literal sense known
as "specific restitution," which involves "restoration in something lost
or taken away."' These dual senses of restitution are captured in a
theory known as "rules-based tracing'"" which draws a parallel
distinction between tracing and "following." The latter is an exercise
that attempts to identify and locate only the value of what has been
misappropriatedfrom a party;49 although the exercise is exclusively
factual, and so does not generate any legal liability, successful
following enables a party to seek a specific restitution claim. In
contrast, tracing is a process that attempts to determine whether certain
value a wrongdoer possesses is a substitute for original value
misappropriated from a party;" although the process also does not
generate any legal liability, successful tracing enables a party to seek
an unjust enrichment claim. In this way, tracing represents a powerful
Equity and in UCC §9-306,68 CORNELL L. REV. 172, 173 (1983). This definition is
premised on certain distinctions that are rebutted by or subsumed within the notion of rulesbased tracing that I use here and that is a form of corrective justice. See hzfra Part 1I.B; see
also Hanoch Dagan, The DistibutiveFoundationof CorrectiveJustice,98 MICH. L. REv. 138
(1999); Lionel Smith, Restitution: The Heart of Corrective Justice, 79 TEX. L. REv. 2115
(2001).
44.
Remedial tracing typically focuses on assets or property, in the way courts focus
on tracing securities. I embrace a conception of tracing that instead focuses on value, a more
principled basis for establishing legal claims. See inlfa Parts II.B, III.A.
45.
PETER BIRKS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 368 (1989).
46.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION: QUASI CONTRACTS AND
CONSTRUCTvE TRUSTS § 1, at 12 (1937) ("A person who has been unjustly enriched at the
expense of another is required to make restitution to the other.") id § 1, at 1 ("The
Restatement of this Subject deals with situations in which one person is accountable to

another on the ground that otherwise he would unjustly benefit or the other would unjustly
suffer loss.").

47.

Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Signficance of Restitution, 67 TEx. L. REV.

1277, 1279 (1989); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 372
(1981) (providing for specific restitution at law and in equity); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF
RESTITUTION: QUASI CONTRACTS AND CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS, supod note 46, § 4 cmt. c

(providing for specific restitution at law); 67ia Part I.A.
48.

See infia Part II.B.

49.
50.

See infra notes 182, 186, and accompanying text.
See infra notes 187-188 and accompanying text.
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tool to impose on the wrongdoer the costs of misappropriation, and
reallocate its benefits to the victim ex post. Dale Oesterle has
observed that "the primary limitation on the scope of the right to trace
is the ignorance of lawyers as to its availability.""
Securities law suffers from not only an ignorance, but also an
impoverished conception, of tracing proper. At best, the current
2
tracing requirement is simply a form of rules-based following.
Courts predicate access to private civil relief under the Securities Act
upon a showing that plaintiffs can identify and locate their purchased
security within a specific fraudulent offering. But while the security is
the object of this exercise, this is not what the Securities Act's remedial
provisions actually restore, which is monetary relief. 3 The current
tracing requirement, then, is not even a form of specific restitution.
Nor is the requirement a form of unjust enrichment. Requiring
security holders to demonstrate a link between their purchase and a
specific fraudulent offering involves no component of inequitable gain
or loss, much less any disgorgement of substituted value. On the
contrary, most security holders cannot satisfy the current tracing
requirement precisely because their purchase is commingled with
other like securities registered in street name from multiple offerings."
Securities law, therefore, applies a conception of tracing that ironically
frustrates, rather than relieves, victims of fraudulent offerings.
This Article proposes a novel way to reconceptualize tracing of
securities culled from its remedial relative, rules-based tracing. Part III
Specifically, Part III
examines tracing within securities law.
demonstrates how the book-entry system has combined with the
judicially created tracing requirement to restrict access to private civil
remedies under the Securities Act and undermine its ability to deter
fraud. Part IV shifts to tracing within remedial law. Specifically, Part
IV analyzes inadequacies with various approaches to tracing assets and
property, and delineates how rules-based tracing's focus on value can
resolve the problems presented by commingled fungible assets. Part V
then reconciles securities and remedial tracing. The critical move is to
reorient securities law toward substituted value, the money exchanged
This method of tracing can solve the problems
for securities."
Oesterle, supm note 43, at 180.
51.
See infra Part III.A.
52.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(e), 77/2) (2000).
53.
See infra Part III.B.
54.
Cf ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN (Warner Bros. 1976) ("I have to do this my way.
55.
You tell me what you know, and I'll confirm. I'll keep you in the right direction if I can, but
that's all. Just... follow the money." (Hal Holbrook aka Deep Throat)).
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presented by multiple offerings with the aid of a simple designation
system. At the point of purchase, security holders need only select an
offering that will be used for making claims under section 11 or
12(a)(2). Permitting these selections is consistent with the Securities
Act's antifraud provisions and with the recently proposed "access
equals disclosure" model. Most importantly, by tracing money instead
of securities, courts can restore all security holders' access to private
civil remedies and optimal deterrence against fraudulent offerings.
II.

METHODOLOGY

This Article is an application of "intradisciplinarity,"56 a method
that "transfers theories, practices, and technologies across legal
domains " ' Intradisciplinarity recognizes that the law is conventionally
organized around certain categorical distinctions, such as the
theoretical divide between the private and public,58 or the curricular
compartmentalizing of civil procedure, contracts, criminal law,
property, and torts. 9 A by-product of these distinctions is that legal
doctrines can arise in different domains of the law and develop in
dissimilar or inconsistent ways.
Intradisciplinarity critically examines these dissimilarities and
inconsistencies. The method juxtaposes and compares concurrent
conceptions of a legal doctrine or method, eliciting structural and
substantive parallels. These parallels then serve as a basis for crossfertilization, utilizing one domain's conception to inform our
understanding and application of another.
In this way,
intradisciplinarity facilitates dialogue between legal domains and
thereby challenges the artificiality of certain categorical barriers within
the law.
56. Anupam Chander, Minorities, Shareholderand Otherwise, 113 YALE L.J. 119,
152 (2003).
57.
Id Anupam Chander perspicuously observes that "intradisciplinarity seems
especially appropriate to law, a discipline that relies on analogical reasoning." Id I agree
with his implicit point that intradisciplinarity is neither necessarily nor advisedly restricted to
law.
58.
See, e.g., Symposium, The Public/PnvateDistinction, 130 U. PA. L. RE. 1289
(1982); Joan Williams, The Development of the Public/PrivateDistinctionin American Law,
64 TEX. L. REV. 225 (1985) (reviewing HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE
POWER: THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW (1983)).
59.
See, e.g., David Rosenberg, The Path Not Taken, 110 HARv. L. REV. 1044, 1044-

45 (1997) (noting, "in reciprocal disdain, torts courses ignore the policy objectives of
adjacent fields like contracts, civil procedure, criminal law, and property," a "path of
increasing social irrelevance and irresponsibility" that departs from Oliver Wendell Holmes's
prescription of the "rational study of law").
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Intradisciplinarity has a distinguished lineage. ° The method has
6
connected seemingly disparate domains such as contract and tort law,
2
tort and criminal law,1 criminal and corporate law," as well as
corporate and evidentiary law.' And a recent movement revitalizing
the method appears to be afoot in corporate circles.65 Cynics might

60. Within legal discourse the method can be traced back to Guido Calabresi and A.
Douglas Melamed, who furnished a principled way to integrate property and tort law.
PropertyRules, LiabilityRules, and Inalienability. One View of the Cathedal,85 HARV.L.
REV. 1089 (1972). Commentators have extended the method to areas such as criminal and
contract law. See hfia notes 62-63 and accompanying text. And intradisciplinarity is
naturally suited for quasi-meta subjects, such as constitutional, intellectual property, and
international law, that encompass a broad range of legal fields. See, e.g., BRUCE A.
ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977); E Scott Kieff & Troy A.
Paredes, The Basics Matter. At the Peripheryof intellectualProperty,73 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
174 (2004) (distilling principles of antitrust, contract, and property law within the framework
of intellectual property law); Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., InternationalLaw andInternational
Relations Theory A New GenerationofnterdisciplinaryScholarship,92 AM. J. INT'L L. 367
(1998) (observing a "lively intradisciplinary debate" within international law about the
relationship between comparative politics and constitutional law). I see no reason why
intradisciplinarity cannot be extended to meta-subjects, such as civil and criminal procedure,
conflicts of law, evidence, and, obviously, remedies. See, e.g., David A. Sklansky & Stephen
C. Yeazell, Comparative Law Without Leaving Home. What Civil Procedure Can Teach
Criminal Procedure, and Vice Versa, 94 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2006), available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract-706601.
See, e.g., PS. ATIYAH, ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW (3d ed. 1980)
61.
(connecting compensation systems within criminal, insurance, labor, and tort law); GRANT
GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974) (arguing that contracts law is being reabsorbed
into the mainstream of tort law). But see, e.g., Jeffrey O'Connell, The InterlockingDeath and
Rebirth of Contract and Tori 75 MICH. L. REV.659 (1977) (suggesting a way to segregate
problems associated with characterizing problems as one of contract or torts).
62. See, e.g., Symposium, The Intersection of Tort andCriminalLaw, 76 B.U. L. REV.
1 (1996); see also Richard A. Epstein, Crime and Tort- Old Wine in Old Bottles, in
ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL: RESTITUTION, RETRIBUTION, AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 231 (Randy
E. Barnett & John Hagel III eds., 1977).
63. See, e.g., LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS: EVASION, BLACKMAIL, FRAUD, AND
KINDRED PUZZLES OF THE LAW (1996); James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information:
Copynght, Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1413 (1992); A.L.
Goodhart, Blackmail and Considerationin Contracts,44 L.Q. REV.436 (1928).
Peter B. Oh, Gatekeeping, 29 J. CORP. L. 735 (2004) (reconciling
64. See, e.g.,
corporate and evidentiary gatekeeping).
See generally Chander, supra note 56 (reconciling the notion of "minorities"
65.
within constitutional and corporate law); Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How To Fix Wall
Street: A Voucher FinancingProposalfor SecuritiesIntermediaries,113 YALE L.J. 269 (2003)
(grafting the notion of vouchers from school and campaign finance schemes to certain private
intermediaries); Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Appeal and Limits of Internal Controls To
Fight Fraud Terrorism, Other Ills, 29 J.CORP. L. 267 (2004) (drawing parallels between the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2001 as a response to recent financial scandals, and the USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001 as a response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001); Thomas
W Joo, Contract, Property,andthe Role of Metaphorin CorporationsLaw,35 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 779 (2002) (examining within corporate law the contractarian metaphor, based on
consent and enforceability, and the property metaphor, based on rights and duties); Robert H.
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dismiss the method as a simple pursuit of consistent approaches
among legal domains.'
With all due respect to Ralph Waldo
Emerson, 7 this Article demonstrates that intradisciplinarity is not
foolishly concerned with its own shadow, but instead has much to do
with tracing in particular and corporate law in general.
III.

TRACING SECURITIES

The express purpose of the Securities Act is to protect investors.
In this vein, sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act provide
private civil remedies for material misstatements or omissions in
connection with a public offering of securities. Access to these
remedies, however, was compromised by the infamous Paper Crunch
of the late 1960s, in which the system for processing securities trades
first collapsed and then overhauled itself; the resulting book-entry
system created a centralized system where fungible securities are now
registered in the name of a third-party intermediary, and not the actual
purchaser.
Severing this link between purchasers and securities has
inadvertently transformed the judicially created tracing requirement.
Courts require plaintiffs seeking relief under sections 11 and 12(a)(2)
to prove that their purchased securities actually were part of a
fraudulent public offering. Tracing securities is thus an evidentiary
standard, requiring security holders to prove factual causation between
the alleged fraud in a specific offering and a purchase of securities.
Not all security holders are alike, however, in the eyes of
securities tracing. When there are multiple offerings, courts apply a
conception of tracing that can be satisfied by only a select group of
Sitkoff, Trust Law,CorporateLaw,andCapitalMarket Efficiency, 28 J. CORP. L. 565 (2003)
(comparing corporate and trust instruments in relation to capital markets).
66. This objection is formally expressed by the "Fallacy of the Transplanted
Category." See Moffatt Hancock, Fallacyofthe TransplantedCategory,37 CAN. B. REv. 535,
547 (1959) ("When a legal category ... is imported into a different context where a different
legal result (involving different policies) is in issue, the transplanted category may well
suggest a result which frustrates the relevant policies which should control the determination
of the new issue."); cf Adam J. Hirsch, IneritanceandInconsistency,57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1057,
1058 (1996) (examining the problem of structural inconsistency, "[t]he theoretical antithesis
of... the so-called fallacy of the transplanted category").
67. See Ralph Waldo Emerson, Self-Reliance, in ESSAYS AND ENGLISH TRATs 66
(C.W Eliot ed., 1909) ("A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little
statesmen and philosophers and divines. With consistency a great soul has simply nothing to
do. He may as well concern himself with his shadow on the wall."). But cf Christoph Engel,
Inconsistency in the Law: In Search of a Balanced Norm (Dec. 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=628387 (contending that consistency in legal rules has limited
consequential value).
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purchasers with direct access to a fraudulent offering. Because of the
book-entry system, aftermarket purchasers receive fungible securities
registered in street name, and cannot trace them reliably back to a
specific offering. As a result, the judicial tracing requirement currently
operates to eviscerate private civil remedies for a broad set of security
holders, and thereby undercut the Securities Act's ability to deter
fraudulent public offerings.
This Part establishes the troubled application of tracing within the
securities context. Opponents and proponents of securities tracing
both ground their arguments in the Securities Act's intent and
provisions. Accordingly, the first step is to examine the statutory relief
afforded by sections 11 and 12(a)(2). This statutory background
provides a reference point by which to contrast the realities of the
book-entry system. The second step is to understand that system's
mechanics in relation to the old system responsible for the Paper
Crunch. Establishing the gap between these statutory remedies and
practical procedures for offered securities creates a context for
understanding this conception of tracing. This, in turn, sets up the
remedial, and ultimately the intradisciplinary, conception of tracing.
A.

The SecuritiesAct of 1933

In the shadow of the "Black Days" 8 and the ensuing Great
Depression, Congress enacted the Securities Act." Otherwise known
68. See, e.g., Steve Thel, The Ongia/ Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securties
Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV 385, 408 n.97 (1990) ("'[T]here was hardly an American
who was not aware of its occurrence and who did not date hard times from, and associate his
distress with, the black days of October 1929."') (quoting David Saul Levin, Regulating the
Securities Industry: The Evolution of a Government Policy 59 (1969) (Ph.D. dissertation,
Columbia University)).
15 U.S.C. § 77k (2000); see also Gadsby, supra note 11, at 9 ("The Securities Act
69.
of 1933 ...became effective on July 7, 1933, a date roughly corresponding to the low point
in the stock market and in our general economy"); James M. Landis, The LegislativeHistory
of the SecuritiesAct of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. RE. 29, 30 (1959) ("The [Securities] [A]ct
naturally had its beginnings in the high financing of the Twenties that was followed by the
market crash of 1929"'). This is not to suggest that Black Monday caused the Great
Depression or that either event singularly prompted Congress to adopt the Securities Act.
See, e.g., JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXcHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 33, 39 (1995)

("[M]uch more than the depression or the preceding stock market crash, it was the Pecora
hearings [examining banking institutions and personalities] that influenced the character of
the 1933 Securities Act and of the Securities and Exchange Commission later created to
enforce it."); see alsoBevis Longstreth, The SECAfier FilyYears: An Assessment ofts Past
and Future, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1593, 1594 (1983) ("[T]he picture that emerges [from
Seligman's account] is one of considerable controversy and political horse trading.").
According to the Securities Act's legislative history, "[tlhe general belief among legislators
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as the "Truth About Securities" Act," this "remarkable piece of
legislation"7 ' has the express purpose of "provid[ing] full and fair
disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign
commerce and through the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale

thereof."72 According to President Franklin Roosevelt, the Securities
Act "adds to the ancient rule of caveat emptor, the further doctrine 'let

the seller also beware.' It puts the burden of telling the whole truth on
the seller." 3 Specifically, through registration requirements, the
Securities Act strives to provide investors with adequate disclosures
and thereby guard against fraudulent offers and sales of all securities."

was that many underwriters and dealers in securities had not been operating in a fair, honest,
and prudent manner." Elisabeth Keller & Gregory A. Gehlmann, IntroductoryComment A
HistoricalIntroduction to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934,49 Omo ST. L.J. 329, 334-35 (1988).
70.
See, e.g., William 0. Douglas & George E. Bates, The FederalSecurities Act of
1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 171 (1933) ("All the [Securities] Act pretends to do is to require the
'truth about securities' at the time of issue, and to impose a penalty for failure to tell the truth.
Once it is told, the matter is left to the investor.").
71.
Cohen, supra note 1, at 1344. But cf Adolph A. Berle, Ihgh Finance: Masteror
Servant,23 YALE REv. 20, 42 (1933) (describing the Securities Act as "spectacular," and yet
also "salutary," in its failure "to solve the problem of who is entitled to the increment of value
arising from organization, or the increment of power arising from control"); Amy L.
Goodman, It Past Time To Rethink the SecuritiesAct of 1933, INSIGHTS, July 2000, at 2
("[Blefore the registration statement is filed, no 'offers to sell may be made' and prior to the
SEC declaring the registration statement effective (the waiting period), no written offers may
be made. The end result is that in many ways the Securities Act is an antidisclosure statute.").
72.
15 U.S.C. § 77a (2000); see also S. REP. No. 73-47, at 1 (1933) ("The basic policy
is that of informing the investors of the facts concerning securities to be offered for sale in
interstate and foreign commerce and providing protection against fraud and
misrepresentation."). The Securities Act further provides that the SEC, whenever "required to
consider or determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest"
"shall also consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the action will promote
efficiency, competition, and capital formation." 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b).
73.
H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 2 (1933) (statement of President Franklin D. Roosevelt);
see also Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 69, at 338 ("The aim [of President Roosevelt's call
for federal securities legislation] was to be full publicity and information, and that no
essentially important element attending the issue shall be concealed from the buying public."
(internal quotation omitted)).
74.
See, e.g., Gadsby, supra note 11, at 9 ("The two principal objectives of the 1933
act were, first, to protect investors by requiring adequate and accurate disclosure regarding
securities distributed to the public in interstate commerce or by use of the mail and, second, to
outlaw fraud in the sale of all securities whether or not newly issued."); Therese H. Maynard,
Liability Under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 for Fraudulent Trading in
PostdistributionMarkets, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 847, 871 (1991) ("Adoption of the 1933
Act served a two-fold purpose. First, Congress intended to provide prospective investors with
full disclosure through the section 5 registration obligation.... Second, Congress intended to
outlaw fraud in connection with the offer and sale of any security, whether registered or
unregistered.").
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The Securities Act provides two private civil remedies for fraud
connected with an offer of securities."

Section 11 imposes strict

liability on persons directly" involved in an offering whose registration
statement misstates or omits material facts." As reliance is generally
presumed," a prima facie case requires only proof of a material
75. This Article does not address remedies under sections 15 and 17(a) of the
Securities Act as they are not subject to the tracing requirement.
76. Five classes of defendants can be held liable under section 11: (1) the issuer;
(2) its current directors or partners; (3) its future directors or partners who have consented to
being named in the registration statement; (4) experts who have consented to being named as
having prepared or certified the registration statement; and (5) underwriters. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k(a)(1)-(5). There have been unsuccessful attempts to attach section 11 liability to a sixth
class of defendants, institutional investors. See, e.g., Jennifer O'Hare, InstitutionalInvestors,
RegistrationRights, and the Specter of Liability Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of
1933, 1996 Wis. L. REv. 217, 222 ("The argument that institutional investors are subject to
liability under Section 11 has so far been rejected by the courts.") (citing cases). For the
issuer, liability "is virtually absolute, even for innocent misstatements." Herman & MacLean
v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983). For other classes of defendants, there is a due
diligence defense. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b).
77. Section 11 relevantly provides:
In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became
effective, contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a
material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements
therein not misleading, any person acquiring such security (unless it is proved that
at the time of such acquisition he knew of such untruth or omission) may, either at
law or in equity. . . sue.
15 U.S.C. § 77k(a); see also Donald C. Langevoort, Deconstructing Section 11: Public
Offering Liability in a ContinuousDisclosureEnviromnen4 63 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45,
45 (2000) ("[S]trict liability ... and failure of 'due diligence' liability ... [have made]
Section 11 the 'bete noire,' in Louis Loss's words, of the legislative scheme." (quoting Louis
Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 4246 (3d ed. 1991))).
78. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a). Reliance is presumed for one year after the posteffective
date. Id Of course, this is a variation of the "fraud on the market" theory first established in
Basic, Inc. v Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-42 (1988), and its underlying Efficient Capital
Markets Hypothesis (ECMH), seminally formulated in Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital
Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work; 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970), and famously
applied to law in Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549 (1984). Among the more serious challenges to the EMCH
have come from legal decision theory, otherwise known as behavioral law and economics.
See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency
Twenty Years Later. The HindsightBias (Ctr. for Law & Econ. Studies, Working Paper No.
240; John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 270; John M. Olin Ctr. for
Law, Econ. & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 446, 2003) (incorporating insights from legal
decision theory into their thesis of the mechanisms of market efficiency), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=462786; Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency:
An Introduction to the New Finance (Univ. of Cal., L.A. Sch. of Law & Econ. Research
Paper Series, Research Paper No. 03-23, 2003) (exploring financial literature on asset
pricing, arbitrage, and behavioral phenomena that suggests alternative ways to analyze market
behavior), availableathttp://ssm.com/abstract=47016 1.
There are, however, extensive concerns about legal decision theory and its critique of the
EMCH. For instance, Greg Mitchell has argued persuasively
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misstatement or omission.79 In comparison, section 12(a)(2) imposes

essentially a negligence standard upon offerors or sellers" of securities
that sign or prepare prospectuses or oral communications in
connection with an offering of securities.8 ' Although reliance is also

presumed, 2 a prima facie case under section 12(a)(2) requires a threea great deal of psychological research ... brings into question the claims of the
legal decision theorists regarding the consistent fallibility ofjudgment and decision
making in experimental settings and qualifies the generalizations that can be safely
drawn from this research.
Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Un warrantedPessimism of the
New BehavioralAnalysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1907, 1936 (2002); see also
Burton G. Malkiel, The EfficientMarket HypothesisandItsCritics, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 59, 80
(2003) ("I suspect that the end result [of the behavioral theory influx] will not be an
abandonment of the belief of many in the profession that the stock market is remarkably
efficient in its utilization of information."). But cf Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The 'New"Law and
Psychology. A Reply to Critics,Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters,85 CORNELL L. REv. 739
(2000).
79.
Section 11 limits total liability to the aggregate offering price. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k(g). Section 11 damages are calculated by a complex formula that subtracts from the
purchase price of a security (1) its sale price, if sold prior to the lawsuit, or (2) its "true" value
at the time the lawsuit commences, if retained throughout the lawsuit. See id. § 77k(e). If a
section 11 plaintiff sells the relevant security after commencing the lawsuit, but before
judgment, courts will deduct the sales price only if it is less than the true value; accordingly,
"[t]he formula set forth in section 11 (e) presents the plaintiff who has not yet sold his or her
securities with a strategic decision: whether or not to sell." 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW
OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 7.5[2], at 615 (2d ed. 1990). If a section 11 plaintiff retains the
relevant security throughout the lawsuit, subsequent price increases or decreases are
irrelevant. See, e.g., Sale, supra note 19, at 437 ("This formula provides the shareholders
who do not sell before suit with a potential windfall if their securities appreciate after the
filing date, but offers no protection if the price declines after the judgment.").
80. The level of active participation necessary to qualify a party as a "seller" under
section 12(a)(2) is a contentious subject. See, e.g., Joseph E. Reece, Would Someone Please
Tell Me the Definitionof the Term "Seller': The Confusion SurroundingSection 12(2) of the
SecuitiesAct of1933, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 35 (1989) (recommending consistency as between
the definitions of "seller" in sections 12(a)(1) and (2)). Due to the privity requirement, there
is only one class of section 12(a)(2) defendants. See ifra note 83 and accompanying text.
81.
Section 12(a)(2) relevantly provides:
Any person who.., offers or sells a security... by means of a prospectus or
oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not
knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of
proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have
known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable ... to the person purchasing
such security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity in any court of
competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for such security ....
15 U.S.C. § 77A?2); cf LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 77, at 982 (opining that "it is best not to
attempt a paraphrase" of section 12(a)(2) as it is "not too happily drafted").
82. See, e.g., Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 E2d 682, 689 (3d Cir.
1991); Smolen v. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, 921 F2d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 1990); Sanders v.
John Nuveen & Co., 619, E2d 1222, 1226 (7th Cir. 1980); Wigand v. Flo-Tek, Inc., 609 E2d
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fold showing: (1) the prospectus or oral communication misstates or
omits a material fact, (2) the registered security holder must not have
known of the fraud at the time of purchase, and (3) privity exists
between the registered security and the seller defendant.83 Moreover,
unlike their section 11 counterparts, section 12(a)(2) defendants have a
defense that they did not and reasonably could not know of the
Both of these private civil
material misstatement or omission."
remedies, however, represent a deterrence-based approach to
preventing fraudulent offerings of securities.85
B

The Book-Entry System

Three decades after the enactment of the Securities Act, brokers
86
By the late
and dealers found themselves in the Paper Crunch.
approximately
to
increased
had
1960s, the daily trading volume
thirteen million within a system designed to process only three
million. As a result,
1028, 1034 (2d Cir. 1980); Alton Box Bd. Co. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 560 E2d 916, 923
(8th Cir. 1977).
See 15 U.S.C. § 77A2). Section 12(a)(2) damages are based on the purchase
83.
price of the security, if sold prior to the lawsuit, or limited to rescission of the purchase of the
security, if retained throughout the lawsuit. See, e.g., Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 77, at
983 ("Rescission and § 12(2) are substantially the same in that both require the buyer to prove
a 'misrepresentation of fact."').
84. See 15 U.S.C. § 77/2). See generally Therese H. Maynard, The Atllmative
Defense ofReasonable Care Under Section 12(2) of the SecuritiesAct of 1933, 69 NOTRE
DAME L. REV 57 (1993). This "reasonable care" standard is different than section I l's "due
diligence" language. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b), with id § 77/(2).
See, e.g., Prepared Testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, U.S. Securities and
85.
Exchange Commission, ConcerningLitigation Under TI-IF,FederalSecuritiesLaws, Before
the House Subcommittee on TelecommunicationsandFinance of the Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, FED. NEWS SERV., July 22, 1994 at *1, http://www.lexis.com (search "Federal
News Service" and "July 22, 1994") (referencing "the importance of private actions under the
... federal securities laws" to provide "deterrence against securities law violations"); see also
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, OptimalDamages in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI.
L. REV. 611, 613 (1985) ("True, people sometimes say that the function of securities law is
'the protection of investors' or 'compensation for wrongs,' but these are just restatements of
the objective of efficient operation of the markets."); Theresa A. Gabaldon, Causation,
Courts,and Congress: A Study of Contradictionin the FederalSecurities Laws, 31 B.C. L.
REV. 1027, 1060 (1990) ("[Dleterrence is the logical, and acknowledged, congressional goal;
its method of accomplishment is imposition of a penalty that sometimes theoretically will
equal but sometimes will exceed the defendant's gain from any misrepresentation.'); cfA.C.
Pritchard, Markets as Monitors. A ProposalTo Replace ClassActions ith Exchanges as
Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REv. 925, 945 (1999) ("Deterrence plays an important
role in reducing [the principal social costs produced by fraud on the market]. Compensation,
by contrast, does little to reduce the costs of fraud on the market.").
86. SEC, UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES, supra note 21, at 28.
87. Id. As a reference point, on January 2, 1934, only 1.27 million shares were traded
NYSE Statistics Archive, available at
on the New York Stock Exchange.
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[t]he back offices of many a broker-dealer resembled a trackless
forest....
Stock certificates and related documents were piled
"halfway to the ceiling" in some offices; clerical personnel were
working overtime, six and seven days a week, with some firms using a
second or even a third shift to process each day's transaction. Hours of
trading on the exchange and over the counter were curtailed to give
back offices additional time after the closing bell."
For instance, from June 12 to December 31, 1968, the New York Stock

Exchange suspended all trading on Wednesdays to allow brokerage
firms time to process trades." By late 1969, stock prices began to
decline and a concomitant reduction in trading volume contributed to
the liquidation of over 160 brokerage firms, impacting thousands of

their customers. 8 According to Joel Seligman, the Paper Crunch "was
the most serious failure of securities industry self-regulation in the
Commission's history," a complete "collapse of industry regulatory
controls."'"

The object of ensuing reform efforts was the very system for
processing securities. Until 1970, clearing and settlement of trades

http://www.nyse.com/marketinfo/stats/vol30-39.dat (last visited Feb. 15, 2006). The increase
in trading volume that induced the Paper Crunch is attributable to the rise of over-the-counter
markets and large financial institutions. See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, Law' Signal: A Cueing
Theory ofLaw in Market Transition,77 S.CAL. L. REv. 215, 274 (2004) ("Over-the-counter
...began to acquire substantial and growing market share. By the late 1950s, large financial
institutions were actively trading large blocks of equity securities. Over the next decade, this
trend would produce a quadrupling of equity share volume."). "Today, the system can easily
handle trading volume on routine days of hundreds of millions of shares." U.C.C. art. 8
prefatory note (rev. 1994). The all-time record for shares traded in one day on the New York
Stock Exchange is 2.81 billion shares on July 24, 2002. NYSE StatisticsArchive, availableat
http://www.nyse.com/attachment/VolOO-03.pm (last visited Feb. 15, 2006).
88. SEC, UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES, supra note 21, at 13; see also Clearance
and Settlement of Securities Transactions: Heatings on S.3412, S.3297 and S2551 Before
the Subcomm. on Securities of the S.Comm.on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 92d
Cong. 95-96 (1972) (reporting that in December 1968 member firms of the New York Stock
Exchange had failed to deliver $4.4. billion and to receive $4.7 million in securities to brokers
or dealers within the customary five business day settlement period) (statement of William J.
Carey, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission). But cf Jeanne L. Schroeder,
Is Article 8 FinallyReady This Time, The Radical Reform of Secured Lending on Wall
Street, 1994 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 291, 312 n.42 (contending drafters of 1997 amendments to
article 8 of the UCC "thought that the 'paper crunch' was a problem of too many pieces of
paper" and "did not consider that the colloquial phrase 'paper work' is shorthand for any
form of clerical work, regardless of the presence or absence of physical pieces of paper").
89. Jeanne L. Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, Security Interests UnderArticle8 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 12 CARDOzo L. REv. 557, 562 n. 13 (1990).
90.

See, e.g., SEC, UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES, supra note 21, at 14; S. REP.

No.92-1009, at 1 (1971); H.R. REP. No. 92-1519, at 9-10 (1972).
91.

SELIGMAN, supra note 49, at 450.
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involved the physical movement of paper stock certificates.92 These
unique certificates, issued by a corporation, evidenced their holder's
ownership and its accompanying rights." To effect a trade, brokers and
dealers wrote the transferee's name on the back of the certificate and
then delivered the actual certificate to the issuer, who then recorded on
its books the change in ownership.' Even in light of the technological
limitations at that time,95 the process was expensive in its consumption
of time and susceptibility to error."
Congress responded by enacting the Securities Investor
Protection Act of 1970 (SIPA). 97 Specifically, SIPA directed the SEC
to "facilitate the establishment of a national system for the prompt and
accurate clearance and settlement of transactions in securities."" By
See Charles W Mooney, Jr., Beyond Negotiability. A New Model for Transfers
92.
and Pledge of Interests in Securies Controlledby Intermedianes, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 307,
316-17 (1990) (defining "clearing" as "the process whereby the trades are compared,
matched, and confirmed" and "settling" as "the process whereby parties to trades fulfill their
obligations thereunder-generally a 'delivery' of the securities by the seller and payment of the
agreed price by the buyer").
U.C.C. art. 8 prefatory note (rev. 1994) ("Ownership of securities was
93. See, e.g.,
").Some states, however, do not
traditionally evidenced by possession of the certificates ....
require corporations to issue stock certificates to shareholders. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 1240 1(a) (2003); see also REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 6.26(a) (3d ed. 2004) ("Unless the
articles of incorporation or bylaws provide otherwise, the board of directors of a corporation
may authorize the issue of some or all of the shares of any or all of its classes or series
without certificates").
94. See, e.g., Suellen M. Wolfe, Escheat and the Concept of Apportionment A
Bright Line Test To Slice a Shadow, 27 ARIZ. ST.L.J. 173, 180 (1995) ("Prior to 1970 ...
[t]he owner would endorse the physical certificate to the name of the assignee on the back of
the certificate.... If the parties used the services of a broker, the seller would transfer the
certificate to his brokerage firm.").
95. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Infonmaton Technology and the Structure
ofSecuties Regulaton,98 HARv.L. REV. 747 (1985).
96. See, e.g., U.C.C. art. 8 prefatory note ("Transfer of securities in the traditional
certificate-based system was a complicated, labor-intensive process."). According to the
SEC's assessment of the Paper Crunch, "the primary cause of the industry's problems was its
inability to accurately, promptly and inexpensively record and process the substantially
increased trading volume of the late 1960's." SEC, UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES, supra
note 21, at 28; see also Guttman, supranote 23, at 718 n.8 (citing causes of failure for sixtyfour securities firms liquidated under SIPA, with "poor books and records" being the most
prevalent reason in forty-four cases).
97. Pub. L. No. 91-598, 84 Stat. 1636 (1970). According to Thomas Joo,
although SIPA was designed to protect broker-dealers by promoting investor
confidence, the loss of investor confidence was not the cause of the failures that
inspired SIPA. Rather, the reverse was the case: Congress feared the failures
attributed to the back office crisis were causing a loss of confidence.
Thomas W Joo, Who Watches the Watchers? The SecuritiesInvestorProtectionAct, Investor
Confidence,and the Subsidization ofFailure,72 S.CAL. L. REV 1071, 1082 (1999).
See also In re Nat'l Sec. Clearing Corp. for Registration as a Clearing Agency,
98.
Exchange Act Release No. 34-13,163, 11 SEC Docket 1449 (Jan. 13, 1977) (delineating, in
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the end of 1971, the SEC reported the creation of a "nationwide netby-net clearance and settlement system for over the counter securities
which promises to minimize substantially the handling of certificates
and speed up the entire transaction process with regard to those

securities for the bulk of the certificate handling problems."99 This, in
turn, led to the eventual introduction of a national book-entry system.'
As with its accounting counterpart, °' the book-entry system
'
involves a combination of physical and nonphysical securities.

Corporations still issue physical stock certificates, but they now
typically are placed in the control of a depository' °3 and registered in

the name of a third party, or a "street name."'"' Clearing and settling
response to the congressional directive, characteristics for a national clearing and settlement
system).
99. SEC, UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES, supra note 21, at 34.
100. The U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve actually began to implement a book-entry
system before the Paper Crunch's onset in 1966, albeit only for Treasury securities. See
Kenneth D. Garbade, Oigins of the FederalReserve Book-Entry System, FED. RES. BANK OF
N.Y. ECON. POL'Y REv., Dec. 2004, at 33, 33. See generallyfHamilton E Potter, Jr. & David L.
McLean, Introductionto Book Entry Transfer ofSecurites,28 Bus. LAw, Nov. 1972, at 209.
101. See, e.g., Wolfe, supm note 94, at 185 ("The book entry system operates like the
accounting system of the same name.").
102. The UCC briefly contemplated a purely uncertificated system, in which, "instead
of surrendering an indorsed certificate for registration of transfer, an instruction would be
sent to the issuer directing it to register the transfer." U.C.C. art. 8 prefatory note (rev. 1994).
This system, however, never completely materialized. See, e.g., Schroeder & Carlson, supra
note 89, at 559-60. What actually emerged was the indirect holding system, in which "the
issuer's records do not show the identity of all of the beneficial owners. Instead, a large
portion of the outstanding securities of any given issue are recorded on the issuer's records as
belonging to a depository." U.C.C. art. 8 prefatory note (rev. 1994). This Article focuses only
on the indirect holding system and its complicating effect on the tracing requirement.
103. In 1968, to track the transfer and volume of shares among its member brokerdealers, the New York Stock Exchange established the Central Certificate Service (CCS).
See The Depository Trust & Cleating Corp.: Evolution ofDTC andNSCC, http://www.dtcc.
com/AboutUs/history.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2006). In 1973, the Depository Trust
Company (DTC) was established to "immobilize securities for broker-dealers and banks,
complete the book-entry delivery of those securities, and handle the myriad operational tasks
required to provide centralized, automated processing." Id. DTC has subsumed CCS and is
now the nation's largest securities repository; at the end of 2003, DTC had decreased its paper
stock holdings to 4.6 million, approximately 20 million less than over a decade ago. SeeThe
Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., 2003 Annual Report: Leading the Transformation 28
(2004), available at http://www.dtcc.com/AboutUs/annual.htm. Along with the National
Securities Clearing Corporation, DTC is a wholly owned subsidiary of The Depository Trust
& Clearing Corporation. See The Depository Trust & Cleating Corp., About DTCC,
http://www.dtcc.com/AboutUs/index.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2006); see also infa note 108
and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas Moers Mayer, Developments in Trading
Claims." Participationsand Disputed Claims, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 733, 747 (1993) ("Most
securities are not held 'of record' by their true owners."). Most securities are registered in the
name of Cede & Company, a partnership whose "sole function ... is to maintain registered
ownership of securities deposited with DTC." Mooney, supra note 92, at 319 n.34; see also
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occurs in three phases.' °' Customers first instruct their brokers to buy
or sell the relevant securities. Brokers then send that instruction to the
clearing corporation. Finally, the clearing corporation proceeds to
compare the reported information, debit or credit the appropriate
trading account, and issue a report to the brokers indicating their net
obligation to deliver or receive securities.' °6
The book-entry system's efficiency is attributable principally to a
streamlining of the brokerage function. Pre-SIPA, brokers were
responsible for processing the legal sale and physical transfer of paper
stock certificates." 7 The book-entry system eliminated the need for
physical transfer by bifurcating the process of legal sale. Brokers
remain responsible for negotiating and settling trades, but their
clearance is now the responsibility of an independent intermediary,
usually Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC). 0° This
intermediary serves as the repository for stock certificates, thereby
diminishing paper-based traffic and its corresponding costs.0 9
This innovation to the clearing and settlement process, however,
is not without consequences. Brokers no longer act as intermediaries
between an issuer and a security holder. Instead, there is a series of
interlocking contracts. "[I]ndividual beneficial owners of securities
have no direct contractual relationships with the depository-rather,
Joo, supm note 97, at 1073 n.3 ("Stock held in street name can represent as much as 80% of a
public company's outstanding shares.").
105. But cf SEC, UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES, supra note 21, at 1 ("Clearance,
settlement, depository and transfer functions form part of a continuous process.").
106. Guttman, supra note 23, at 724-26.
107. See supm notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
108. Created in 1999, DTCC is owned by banks, brokers and dealers, mutual fund
finms, and its two preferred shareholders, the National Association of Securities Dealers and
New York Stock Exchange. See The Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., About DTCC,
http://www.dtcc.com/AboutUs/index.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2006); see also James D. Cox
& Randall S.Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table: Do InstitutionalInvestors Fail To File
Claims in Securities ClassActions 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 855, 868 n.69 (2002) (describing DTC
as "an entity that owes much of its existence to the efficiency of not depending upon
individual owners to physically deliver share certificates to an intermediary each time the
securities are sold"). Before DTCC, DTC was responsible for clearing functions. See supra
note 103 and accompanying text.
109. Computerizing the clearance process undeniably has reduced the need for paper
Mooney, supra note 92, at 320 n.37 ("The principal savings from
stock certificates. See, e.g.,
eliminating certificates would relate to DTC[C]'s costs of physical storage, retrieval, deposit
and withdrawal of certificates for participants' customers."). This technological innovation,
however, is distinct from and arguably less significant than the structural innovation of a
("Even without
centralized custodian of either paper or uncertificated securities. See, e.g., id.
actually eliminating paper certificates, the successful development by DTC[C] of the 'book
entry only' (BEO) system for securities issuance and transfer has resulted in substantial
savings for securities issuers.").
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individuals have contractual relationships with their brokers, which in
turn have contractual relationships with the depository or, as is often
the case, relationships with another intermediar.. which in turn is in
privity with the depository.""'
A path, therefore, does exists from a security holder to the
depository, but there is no real connection between the depository and
the issuer. Thus, there is no longer a path between the issuer and a
security holder. Further, the book-entry system centralizes custody of
securities by altering their very nature: securities are now fungible
financial instruments."' The use of a common nominee means that
there is no real difference between any of the securities held by the
depository; one security is as tradable as another."2 To be sure, this is
what ensures that the book-entry system will not suffer from another
Paper Crunch. And that catastrophic collapse militates against
revisiting any sort of processing system that depends on paper stock
certificates. Nevertheless, the book-entry system has severed the
security holder's relationships to a particular security and to its issuer.
C

DoctrinalMethods

The severance has cast doubt over which shareholders may have
access to private civil remedies under the Securities Act for fraudulent
offerings. Neither section 11 nor 12(a)(2) provides an explicit answer.
Section 11 merely states that "[iun case any part of the registration
statement" contains such misstatements or omissions, "any person
acquiring such security ... may, either at law or in equity, sue.""' 3
Similarly, section 12(a)(2) provides that "[a]ny person who ...offers
or sells a security ... shall be liable ... to the person purchasing such
110. Joo, supm note 97, at 1073 n.3. Privity here is distinct from what is required by
section 12(a)(2). See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
111. See, e.g., Mooney, supanote 92, at 319-20 n.34 ("Were the securities not part of
a fungible bulk, much of the benefit of the intermediary control phenomenon would
evaporate.").
112. See, e.g.,
id.
at 310 ("The property interest received by a purchaser on the books
of its securities intermediary bears little resemblance to the property interest resulting from a
physical delivery of a certificated security or registration on the books of an issuer."). But cf
Guttman, supm note 23, at 719 ("The system which is evolving is one applicable to the
securities industry as such and does not affect the individual investor, unless the investor
insists on becoming a registered owner of his shares or desires to hold the certificate himself
.....
).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2000); see alsoBarnes v. Osofsky, 373 E2d 269, 271 (2d Cir.
1967) ("The key phrase is 'any person acquiring such security'; the difficulty, presented when
as here the registration is of shares in addition to those already being traded, is that 'such' has
no referent.").
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securityfrom him, who may sue either at law or equity in any court of
competent jurisdiction.""' Absent from these provisions is any sense
of what "such security" one must purchase to be entitled to relief.' Is
a remedy under the Securities Act available to a person who purchases
any security similar to that issued in a particular offering? Or must a
person purchase a security actually issued in the relevant offering to be
eligible for relief?
The judicial answer comes in the form of a tracing requirement.
Since 1967,' 16 courts have interpreted section 11 "as applying only to
purchasers who can trace the lineage of their shares to the new
offering";" 7 and, building on the troubling decision in Gustafson v
Alloyd Co.," 8 courts subsequently have interpreted section 12(a)(2) as
requiring plaintiffs to "trace" their securities to an initial public
offering."9' In essence, tracing withholds access to private civil relief
114. 15 U.S.C. § 7711(2) (emphasis added).
115. This is distinct from the grand question of what actually constitutes a "security."
See, e.g., Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 77, at 923-1138.
116. This slightly precedes the enactment of SIPA, which introduced the book-entry
system. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
117. Barnes, 373 E2d at 271; see also Cumin & Ford, supra note 11, at 165 n.60
(citing cases); Sale, supra note 19, at 453 n. 163 (citing cases). Interestingly, the shareholder
plaintiffs in Barnes were the ones who characterized this interpretation of section 11 as
"tracing." Barnes, 373 F.2d at 271.
118. 513 U.S. 561 (1995). The Gustafson Court held that a private stock placement
agreement did not constitute a "prospectus," and thus was not sufficiently connected with an
initial offering to be actionable under section 12(a)(2). Id.at 583. Prior to Gustafson, a
virtual consensus existed among courts and commentators that section 12(a)(2) permitted
claims concerning secondary and private purchases of securities. Justice Ginsburg's dissent
in Gustafson observed:
Commentators writing shortly after passage of the Act understood § 12(2) to
cover resales and private sales, as well as public offerings. Felix Frankfurter,
organizer of the team that drafted the statute, firmly stated this view...
Most subsequent commentators have agreed that § 12(2), like § 17(a), is not
confined to public offerings.
Id.at 601-02 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Not surprisingly, the Court's
decision has been the subject of vigorous criticism. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge,
SecuritiesAct Section 12(2): Alter the Gustafson Debacle,50 Bus. LAW. 1231, 1270 (1995)
("[T]he majority opinion is at best bizarre and borders on the irresponsibly unintelligible.").
119. See, e.g., Shapiro v. UJB Fin. Corp., 964 E2d 272, 287 n.16 (3d Cir. 1992) ("If
defendants were eventually to prove that the shares came from the secondary market, § 12(2)
would not apply, and judgment would be entered for them."); see also supra notes 118 and
accompanying text. Interestingly, only the United States Courts of Appeals for the Third and
Eleventh Circuits have made an explicit appellate reference to the tracing requirement under
section 12(a)(2). See, e.g., First Union Disc. Brokerage Servs., Inc. v. Milos, 997 E2d 835,
843-44 (11 th Cir. 1993) ("[W]e are persuaded by the Third Circuit's reasoning and hold that
section 12(2) of the 1933 Act does not apply to aftermarket transactions." (citations omitted));
see also Sale, supra note 19, at 454 nn. 164-67 (citing district court cases). Other courts
instead tend to discuss tracing under section 12(a)(2) in the guise of either the privity
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unless plaintiffs can prove that they purchased a security from a
specific

public

offering involving

a material

misstatement or

omission."
The requirement can be understood by its impact on three
primary classes of security holders, defined by their proximity to a
public offering.'
Class I comprises security holders that have
unmediated access to a public offering, a limited group that includes
institutional investors and underwriters as well as their spinning

partners. ' Class 11 comprises security holders that have access the
public offering only through a secondary market, otherwise known as
the "aftermarket.' 23 Finally, Class III comprises security holders that
have no access to a public offering,24 but instead purchase similar types
of securities in a different offering.
These classes have varying access to private civil remedies under
the Securities Act depending on the tracing method a court may apply.
The Direct Tracing Method, "the easiest method to understand and

prove, " ' is correspondingly also the most accepted."6 Courts assess a
requirement, see supra note 83 and accompanying text, or aftermarket purchases, see infia
notes 123-124 and accompanying text.
120. Sale, supianote 19, at 441 ("Courts use the term 'tracing' to refer to the judicially
created requirement that to access sections I1 and 12(a)(2) shareholders must plead and
prove that they bought shares issued either 'in' the public offering for which the registration
statement or prospectus was issued, or 'pursuant to' that offering." (citing Feiner v. SS&C
Techs., Inc., 47 E Supp. 2d 250,252 (D. Conn. 1999))).
121. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., Inre Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 227 ER.D. 65, 117-19 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (citing cases); see also Hillary A. Sale, Gatekeepers, Disclosure, andIssuer Choice, 81
WASH. U. L.Q. 403,415 (2003) ("Members of Congress have benefited from investment bank
largesse. Some members benefited from spinning, receiving IPO shares at the offering price
that they were allowed to flip in the market at easy profits."); supra note 32 and
accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., In re Initial Pub. Offenng Sec. Litig., 227 F.R.D. at 117-19 (citing
cases). Small and individual investors are usually Class II security holders as they "can rarely
get in on ...hot initial public offerings (IPOs) because IPOs are largely private club[s] that
the average investor [i]sn't invited to join." Sale, supra note 19, at 441 (internal citations &
quotations omitted).
124. See, e.g., Sale, supra note 19, at 443.
125. Kirkwood v. Taylor, 590 F Supp. 1375, 1378 (D. Minn. 1984), aff, 760 F2d 272
(8th Cir. 1985) (unpublished table decision). Notably, the Supreme Court has rejected the
need for Direct Tracing in the context of 18 U.S.C. § 666 (1996), which governs theft or
bribery in connection with programs receiving federal funds. See, e.g., Salinas v. United
States, 522 U.S. 52, 56-61 (1997); see also United States v. Cabrera, 328 F.3d 506, 509-10
(9th Cir. 2003) ("[C]ircuits have since split on whether to require a federal nexus [between
theft or bribery and expenditure of federal funds], with [the Second and Third Circuits]
requiring one and [the Sixth and Seventh Circuits] holding that none is required.").
126. See, e.g., In re Initial Pub. Offenng Sec. Litig., 227 F.R.D. at 117-19 (citing
cases).
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plaintiff's ability to trace their purchased securities directly back to a
specific offering by examining multiple factors:
[A]n indication of interest by the broker on behalf of the customer, the
customer's receipt of a preliminary prospectus with a legend in red ink
(called a "red herring"), a notation on the purchase order ticket showing
purchase in the offering, purchase at the offering price, lack of
commission, language regarding the prospectus on the customer's
of the transaction by the
confirmation slip,
27 and special coding
brokerage firm.

Satisfying these factors is relatively easy for Class I security holders,
as they have an opportunity to purchase a security prior to its entrance
into the aftermarket.
Class II and II security holders, however, face a significant
practical problem. Courtesy of the book-entry system, these two
classes of security holders are simply beneficial owners, and not
record holders, of publicly offered securities.'28 And, because of
29
This is
centralized repositories, these securities are fungible.'
as its
offering,
one
only
conducted
has
unproblematic when an issuer
3°
connection to all of the securities purchased is inferentially clear.'
But issuers can, and often do, conduct multiple offerings.'' In such
circumstances, courts have held that "a plaintiff is entitled to a
presumption that she has satisfied the tracing requirement ...only if
every such offering was defective.'

32

Accordingly, whenever one

among multiple offerings is nonfraudulent, Class II and HI security
holders cannot trace their aftermarket purchases.
The Fungible Mass Tracing Method attempts to address this
problem. Statistical probability determines whether a particular
security is part of a specific public offering. Courts calculate this
probability by simply dividing the number of shares issued in the
disputed public offering by the number of total shares issued in all
public offerings. In the case of one offering the probability would be
100% that the plaintiffs purchased securities in connection with
material misstatements or omissions. In the case of multiple offerings
127. K)rkwood, 590 E Supp. at 1378 (citation omitted).
128. See supranotes 104, 110-112, and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 111-112 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., In re Inidal Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 227 ER.D. at 117-18 ("Tracing
may be established... through proof that the owner bought her shares in a market containing
only shares issued pursuant to the allegedly defective registration statement." (emphasis
added)).
131. See supranote 29 and accompanying text.
132. In re InitialPub.Offering Sec. Litig., 227 ER.D. at 119 (emphasis added).
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the probability must be "some particular number" that constitutes a
preponderance of the evidence,'33 roughly quantified by some courts
and commentators as greater than 50%.' 34
Courts, however, generally have rejected the Fungible Mass
Tracing Method within the securities context. First, the method
establishes only that certain securities "might'" and not actually, have
been issued in a specific fraudulent offering; this is an inferential leap
in causation that courts have refused to make.' Second, the method
provides remedies to an overinclusive class of security holders;
provided the requisite probability obtains, even plaintiffs with
nonfraudulent securities could trace successfully. "'
A more reliable and less inclusive method is Contrabroker
Tracing. Under this method, security holders need to demonstrate a
chain of purchase from a broker to another broker or underwriter that
directly participated in the disputed offering."'
Proof of an
underwriter's involvement, however, does not dispositively connect a
security with the offering; underwriters can be market makers that
facilitate over-the-counter trading by buying and selling securities that
may not be from the relevant offering.' Moreover, the method is still
overinclusive; provided the contrabroking link exists, any securities
purchased from that broker or underwriter would enable any plaintiff
to satisfy the tracing requirement.'
Similar to the Contrabroker Method's focus on underwriters, the
Heritage Method looks to the stock certificates for a causal link. The

133. Kirkwood v. Taylor, 590 E Supp. 1375, 1379 (D. Minn. 1984); see also im'ra notes
242-243 and accompanying text.
134. See, e.g., InreElscint,Ltd. Sec. Litig., 674 E Supp. 374, 380 (D. Mass 1987); see
also inhfa note 244 and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., In re Itial Pub.Offen'ng Sec. Litig, 227 ER.D. at 118 (citing cases).
136. See, e.g., Kh-kwoo 590 E Supp. at 1380 ("Even if the court somehow limited
the class of plaintiffs to those who held shares on or after the offering date, all persons who
held stock in street name on and after the offering date could claim a proportional interest in
the shares. The issuer could find itself liable for far more than the number of shares issued in
the challenged offering'").
137. See, e.g., id.
at 1381. No plaintiff has convinced a court to apply this method, and
so it is not discussed extensively here.
138. See, e.g., Mark A. Allebach, Small Business,Equity Financing,and the Intemet:
The Evolution of a Solution?, 4 VA.J.L. & TECH. 3, 63 (1999) ("In a standard offering, the
underwriter may function as a market maker for the stock, facilitating secondary trading.").
139. Kirkwood, 590 E Supp. at 1381 ("Obviously at some point plaintiffs' assumption
must be false; otherwise anyone who ever purchased from a participant in the underwriting
after the offering date could claim he or she bought 'new' stock under this contrabroker
theory.").
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method, the "most complex" one recognized by courts,' ° follows the
path of stock certificates that bear unique code numbers from brokers
to purchasers. Not all stock certificates, however, bear unique code
Moreover, stock certificates reflect the increments
numbers."'
purchased and not the specific offering involved."2 Accordingly, the
Heritage Method provides perhaps the most speculative evidence of
causation between a security holder's purchase and an issuer's
misstatements or omissions.
All of these tracing methods, however, suffer from the same
glaring problem. Whenever there are multiple offerings, the tracing
requirement arbitrarily segregates according to the security holder
class.' 3 Only Class I security holders have any reliable access to
private civil remedies under the Securities Act. Class II and f1I
security holders, however, must overcome all the difficulties associated
with the use of fungible securities registered in street name.
Accomplishing this feat, as courts have acknowledged, is "virtually
Indeed, all of these possible tracing methods are
impossible.""
effectively an attempt to assist Class II and III security holders in this
regard. But because this is a substantial group of security holders, the
stringent application of the tracing requirement inadvertently confers a
benefit on defendants involved in multiple offerings. As long as one of
them involves nonfraudulent securities, these defendants can eliminate
or reduce their liability under sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities
Act.' 5 The net effect, then, is that the tracing requirement represents a
way to avoid private civil remedies, and thereby severely compromises
their deterrence effect.

140. Id. at 1382. As with the Contrabroker Method, no plaintiff has convinced a court
to apply the Heritage Method, and so it is not discussed extensively here.
141. See, e.g., Sale, supra note 19, at 452 n.153 ("Today ... the usual practice is to
hold shares in street names. As a result, this [heritage] method is unlikely to prove fruitful for
modem shareholders."). A simple solution might be to require all brokers or centralized
holding companies to keep records of which security is sold or purchased. This is akin to the
more conceptually sound designation system that I propose. See infa Part III.C.
142. Kihkwooa 590 ESupp. at 1381.
143. See, e.g., Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 E2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1967) ("[T]his
construction [of the tracing requirement] gives ... a rather accidental impact as between one
open-market purchaser of a stock already being traded and another."); Klein v. Computer
Devices, Inc., 591 E Supp. 270, 273 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("If the purchaser bought identical
securities already being traded on the open market, he must look elsewhere for relief.").
144. In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 227 ER.D. 65, 118 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); see
also id. at 119 n.402 ("The advent of fungible bulk storage has made plaintiffs' tracing
requirement a stringent one indeed ... ").
145. See supra note 36 and accompanying text; infma Part III.B.
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REMEDIAL TRACING

Part I established deficiencies within securities law's tracing
requirement. These deficiencies prompt one to look beyond the
securities context and examine conceptions of tracing in other areas of
the law. This examination begins, and ends, with remedial law, the
original source of tracing.
Remedial tracing is a venerable product of civil law. The
method's heritage is manifest in an ongoing controversy over distinct
conceptions of tracing in equity and at common law. The justification
for all conceptions of tracing, however, lies in restitution.
Conventional restitution seeks to redress unjust enrichment by
disgorging benefits inequitably gained at another's expense, while
specific restitution seeks to restore misappropriated value to its
original owner.
Rules-based tracing reconciles both forms of restitution. Unlike
other competing conceptions, rules-based tracing does not focus on
assets or property, but rather the value inherent in things. The first step
is to determine whether misappropriated value has traveled into a
wrongdoer's hands; this is part of an exercise known as "following"'
which is a factual inquiry that enables one ultimately to claim specific
restitution. Tracing, however, involves a substitution of value. The
second step, then, is to determine whether certain value in a
wrongdoer's possession is derived from misappropriated value, and
thus subject to a claim of unjust enrichment.
Rules-based tracing also fares well with the classic problem of
commingled funds. The difficulty lies in the fact that such funds are
fungible instruments, as in the case of a bank account. Courts have
devised a myriad of rules for tracing through bank accounts where
there has been a deposit or withdrawal of the wrongdoer's own funds.
These rules, which focus on assets or property, are not necessarily
inconsistent with a focus on value. But rules-based tracing does
present a more principled approach to bank accounts, by
understanding them as a simple exchange in value.
This Part completes the foundation necessary to set up the
ultimate intradisciplinary comparison between tracing within the
securities and remedial contexts. Although mindful of corollary
securities notions, the analysis here is not explicitly comparative.
Rather, the analysis provides a parallel account of rules-based tracing
that ultimately suggests how it may be applied to fungible securities.
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EquitableandLegalFoimulations
The origins of tracing date back to early eighteenth-century civil

jurisprudence.1 6 English courts introduced the method as a way to

protect the ownership rights of beneficiaries in res from errant
trustees.' 7 Specifically, the doctrine entitled beneficiaries to claim the
proceeds of misappropriated res that a predatory trustee already had
converted into a different form. As one court explained,
[i]t makes no difference in reason or law into what other form different
from the original, the change may have been made ... for the product

of or substitute for the original thing still follows the nature of the thing
'
itself, as long as it can be ascertained to be such.... 48
Such indifference to the proceeds' ultimate form is possible because
tracing focuses on what lies in the custody of the wrongdoer, rather
than the whereabouts of the misappropriated res. This focus is
premised on a judicial assumption that the transfer of misappropriated
res was valid.'49
Characteristic of its vintage, tracing has concurrent equitable and
legal roots.'5° Equity conferred a proprietary right upon the original
146. See, e.g., Kendar v. Milward, 23 Eng. Rep. 882 (1702); Halcott v. Markant, 24
Eng. Rep. 81 (1701). For early American applications and analyses of remedial tracing, see
Schuyler v Littlefiela 232 U.S. 707 (1914); NationalBank v Insurance Co., 104 U.S. 54
(1881); James Barr Ames, Following MisappropriatedPropertyinto Its Product 19 HARV. L.
REv. 511 (1906); Samuel Williston, The Right To Follow TrustProperty When Confused with
Other Property, 2 HARV. L. REv. 28 (1888). Included among the doctrine's glorious
applications is Charles K. Ponzi's pyramid scheme at the turn of the twentieth century. See In
re Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1 (1924); Lowell v. Brown, 280 E 193 (D. Mass 1922);
Ponzi, 268 E 997 (D. Mass 1920). In adjudicating claims against Ponzi's estate, Chief Justice
William Taft opined that various creditors "must trace the money, and therein they have
failed." Cunningham,265 U.S. at 11.
147. Oesterle, supra note 43, at 186-87 (noting that the birth of tracing "was
understandable: to provide relief against errant trustees, English equity courts granted
beneficiaries a proprietary right to follow misappropriated property into its product" and that
this right "was a fictional extension of the beneficiary's fluid equitable ownership interest in
the trust res"). Oesterle provides a rich, historical account of remedial tracing. See id. at 18695.
148. Taylor v. Plumer, 105 Eng. Rep. 721, 726 (1815); see also In re Hallett's Estate,
13 Ch.D. 696, 708-09 (1879) ("There is no distinction ... between a rightful and a wrongful
disposition of the property, so far as regards the right of the beneficial owner to follow the
proceeds." (emphasis added)). But see infa Part uI.B.
149. See, e.g., Oesterle, supra note 43, at 188 ("[A]t the plaintiff's election a court
would presume conclusively that the errant trustee had acted with proper authority when the
exchange was made. This simple fiction of regularity was the seed of all current tracing
doctrine.").
150. See, e.g., Paul Matthews, The Legal andMoralLimits of Common Law Tracing,
in LAUNDERING AND TRAcING 23, 31-32 (Peter Birks ed., 1995) ("There are two different sets

of rules of tracing:

those for tracing at common law, and those for tracing in Equity.
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owner of misappropriated res to its proceeds; this conferral was
predicated on the wrongdoer assuming the role of a trustee that had
breached its fiduciary duty towards its principal, the original owner.'5 '
In contrast, the common law did not recognize the trust,'52 and instead
regarded the wrongdoer as a bailee whose sale of misappropriated
goods conferred the original owner with legal title to their proceeds.'

(emphasis added)). Matthews maintains that this distinction makes sense even in light of the
merger of law and equity within the United States:
[I]f tracing has different rules at law and in equity, that is because the rules were
evolved to deal with different situations, and still do so.... It may be
pedagogically or analytically sensible to put both systems together (without
changing any rules) and to treat the composite whole as 'the rules of tracing',
although, given the importance of history in understanding English law, I am
inclined to think that this would obscure rather more than it would illuminate.
Id at 32; see also N.E. PALMER, BAILMENT 290 (2d ed. 1991) ("This view that the common
law doctrine of tracing has been fused with its equitable counterpart has rightly been
described as an expression of hope rather than a statement of reality and weakens the
expression of view accordingly."); htiii note 152 and accompanying text.
151. See, e.g.,
RoY GOODE, CoMMERCIAL LAW § 11 (ii), at 52-53 (3d ed. 2004).
152. Considerable controversy exists within the civil law over whether common law
tracing requires a fiduciary relationship between the original owner of property and its
converter. See, e.g., Michael Scott, The Right To "Trace"atCommon Law, 7 U.W AusT. L.
REV. 463, 479 (1966) ("At common law ... no fiduciary relationship needs to be postulated
....It should not be necessary at this date to argue this last point; and within the limits of
this article it is scarcely possible, without wading into [a] morass of academic controversy
Lionel Smith
.).
...
disagrees:
It is sometimes said that a prerequisite to tracing in a court of equity is the
establishment of a fiduciary relationship. If this were true, the consequences
would be startling.
...It is to be hoped that courts will heed the weight of academic
commentary and discard the notion that a fiduciary relation is a prerequisite to
tracing in equity.
SMITH, supra note 43, at 120, 130 (citations omitted). There is even dispute over the
significance of tracing at common law. Compare, e.g., Scott, supra,at 466 (referencing "the
very pertinent fact that the great majority of 'tracing' cases are cases arising out of common
law relationships"), with SIR ROBERT GOFF & GARETH JONES, THE LAW OF RESTrruTION 48
(2d ed. 1978) ("In restitution the common law of tracing has been in practice of little
importance.... [E]quity has successfully intervened to enable claimants to trace money and
negotiable instruments, particularly when money has become mixed with other money in a
bank account"). This fiduciary requirement historically has not held true in American courts.
See Oesterle, supranote 43, at 187 n.28 ("For years American courts could afford to be lax on
the matter because they do not require a fiduciary relationship for tracing relief in equity.").
In any event, the intradisciplinary conception of tracing proposed here revolves around the
Securities Act, which awards monetary relief See infia Part III.B.
153. See, e.g., PALMER, supra note 150, at 288 ("At common law, [a proprietary claim]
entails that the claimant should have an immediate right to possession of the goods as against
the defendant.").
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Although the differences are hardly trivial,'54 these conceptions of
tracing do share a common principle. As Lionel Smith has noted,
equitable and legal tracing both "subordinate the interests of
wrongdoers in the same way" and also are "willing to treat
nonwrongdoers equally."'55 When presented with a choice between
these parties, tracing harnesses the powerful intuition that the law
should relegate the wrongdoer's interests beneath those of the victim
and any third party.'56 And, by extension, even when the wrongdoer
misappropriates and then converts something into greater value,
tracing can award that entire value to the victim.'57
The rationale for tracing is rooted within restitution itself The
law of restitution, which concerns "benefit-based liability or benefitFirst,
based recovery,"'5' encompasses two distinct principles. 9
at 52-53 (comparing historical
GOODE, supra note 151, § 11(ii),
154. See, e.g.,
conceptions of tracing in equity and law); Scott, supra note 152, at 479 (observing that
common law and equitable tracing differ in that "(a) the consequent right of action at
common law is not in personam, but in equity in rem, and (b) the common law right of action
can thus survive the loss or destruction of the res, while the equitable right of action depends
upon its continued possession by the defendant").
155. SMITH, supra note 43, at 278. This is in contrast to the proprietary rights rationale
that other commentators frequently cite in support of tracing. See, e.g., PALMER, supra note
150, at 287 ("There are a number of reasons why a person may wish to employ the
proprietary remedy of tracing ....The most obvious reason is that a person who has the
right to trace will take priority over other creditors in the case of an insolvency.").
156. See, e.g., Oesterle, supra note 43, at 176-77 ("[T]he basic tracing paradigm has
substantial intuitive appeal. Notions of vindicating title, of deterring misappropriation, of
disgorging unlawfully acquired profits ...all seem to coalesce in support of the result."); see
also supra note 45 and accompanying text.
Oesterle, supranote 43, at 176 ("In sum, courts find it more desirable to
157. See, e.g.,
give the victim a windfall ... than to allow the wrongdoer to keep any profit"). The most
extreme version of this principle is the "swollen assets" theory courts applied to bankruptcy
cases during the Great Depression. Upon a mere showing of an equitable wrong, courts
would award prioritized claims to certain victims over other third-party creditors when the
funds had become commingled in an insolvent bank; most civil and common law courts
reject this theory. See, e.g., id. at 189 n.33. But see, e.g., 2 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF
REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 6.1(3), at 14 (2d ed. 1993) ("There is some

authority taking a more liberal view [of the swollen assets theory]... ")(citing cases).
158.

HANOCH DAGAN, TiHE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION 1 (2004).

159. This distinction is the subject of intense controversy. See, e.g., Colleen P
Murphy, Msclassi6"ngMonetaryRestitution,55 SMU L. REv. 1577, 1581-98 (2002). Both
the Restatement of the Law of Restitution and a significant group of civil and common law
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF
scholars equate restitution with unjust enrichment. See, e.g.,
RESTITUTION:

QUASI CONTRACTS AND CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS, § 1 (1937);

1 DOBBS, supra

note 157, § 1.1, at 6 ("[R]estitution today is a general term for diverse kinds of recoveries
aimed at preventing unjust enrichment of the defendant and measured by the defendant's
");Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1191, 1193 (1995)
gains ....
("The modem consensus puts unjust enrichment at the heart of liability in restitution, so the
question, simply put, is whether restitution properly includes anything else."). Other scholars
believe unjust enrichment is but a subdivision of restitution. See, e.g., SMrrH, supra note 43,
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"specific restitution" provides relief in the form of restoration of the
actual misappropriated asset or property to its original owner.6°
Second, unjust enrichment provides various forms of relief to victims
at whose
expense another party has obtained legally unjustifiable
61
gains.1

Conventional conceptions of tracing can involve either of these
restitutionary principles. On one level, tracing can provide specific
restitution to victims that identify misappropriated assets or property
within the hands of a defendant or a third party.'62 On another level,
tracing can redress unjust enrichment when there has been a
substitution or commingling of the victim's misappropriated assets or
property with those of a defendant or third party.'63 Under either

at 294 ("The goal of restitution is to reverse the transfer of wealth from the plaintiff to the
defendant."); Laycock, supra note 47, at 1279 ("'Restitution' means recovery based on and
measured by unjust enrichment. It also means restoration in kind of a specific thing. Both
usages are part of any complete definition of restitution.") (footnotes omitted)). But c, e.g.,
Oesterle, supa note 43, at 176 n.9 ("Restitution is most commonly understood... as a grab
bag of judge-made rules developed originally in both the early Anglo-American law and
equity courts."). I take no position on the distinction, but use it only to clarify a subsequent
distinction between claiming, following, and tracing. See infla Part III.B.
160. Laycock, supra note 47, at 1279-80 ("[R]estitution continues to include remedies
that restore to plaintiff the specific thing he lost or that undo disrupted transactions and
restore both parties to their original positions in kind."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 372(1) (1981) ("Specific restitution will be granted to a party who
is entitled to restitution."); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION: QUASI CONTRACTS
AND CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS § 4 cmt. c (1937) ("Specific restitution in actions at law").
Laycock believes there is a third sense of restitution, compensatory damages. Laycock, supra
note 47, at 1282. This theory is not discussed, as the Securities Act's remedies are based on a
deterrence theory. See supra note 85 and accompanying text; see also Murphy, supra note
159, at 1585 (asserting that prominent restitutionary theorists "would agree that 'restitution'
must be distinguished from 'compensation,' a remedy measured by the plaintiff's loss").
161. See, e.g.,
GOFF & JONES, supranote 152, at 11 ("There are many circumstances in
which a defendant may find himself in possession of a benefit which, in justice, he should
restore to the plaintiff.... 'Unjust Enrichment' is, simply, the name which is commonly
given to the principle of justice which the law recognises and gives effect to in a wide variety
of claims of this kind."); Andrew Kull, Restitutions Outlaws, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 17, 17
(2003) ("Restitution, meaning the law of unjust enrichment ...[bases liability on the
principle] that the defendant has been enriched without legal justification at the expense of
the plaintiff; it is not that the defendant has necessarily done anything wrong."); Nicholas J.
McBride & Paul McGrath, The Nature ofRestitution, 15 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 33 (1995)
(contending that restitution entails only a common law duty borne by the defendant to correct
unjust enrichment).
162. See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
163. See infra Part If.C; see also Oesterle, supra note 43, at 175-76 (observing that
some theorists "argue that tracing is restitutionary in that the doctrine is premised on the
principle of unjust enrichment-the conceptual thread that is said to unite all restitutionary
doctrines."). Oesterle, however, contends that "[t]he principle of unjust enrichment cannot be
defensibly invoked to justify most of the numerous applications of tracing" because the
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principle, conventional tracing thus represents a powerful reallocative
tool. The method enables courts to impose the full costs of
misappropriation on a wrongdoer, while shifting all of the benefits to a
victim ex post.
B.

Rules-BasedTmcing

Like the myriad of forms that misappropriated assets or property
can assume, the doctrine of tracing has mutated over time. According
to Lionel Smith, "[t]he complexity of tracing has been exacerbated by
a history of inexact use of language, and a consequent failure to
distinguish it from related matters."'"4 Courts and commentators have
65
'
referred to tracing within and across legal contexts as "claiming,"'
"identifying" ' 66 "following,"' 67 "standing"'168 and "transactional
links."69 This semantic confusion only complicates the substantive
7°
controversy over equitable versus legal conceptions of tracing,' and its
basis in restitution as either restoration or unjust enrichment.''
A way out of this morass is to have a principled understanding of
2
tracing, or what Lionel Smith calls "rules-based tracing.'0

This

conception presents tracing as a process by which courts apply legal
doctrine is actually "a complicated faqade for a rough doctrine of causation." Oesterle, supra
note 43, at 190.
164. SMITH, supranote 43, at 3.
GoFF&JoNES, supranote 152, at 46-63.
165. See, e.g.,
166. See, e.g., BIRKs, supra note 45, at 358 ("The exercise of identifying the surviving
enrichment is called tracing."); David Hayton, Equity' IdentificationRules, in BiRKS, supra
note 150, at 1 ("[T]he equitable rules where new assets have been acquired in place of the
original trust property ...endeavour to identify the value of the original property in new
assets so as to ascertain the value surviving in the defendant's hands."); Scott, supra note 152,
at 478 ("[T]he word 'trace' is commonly used... as meaning no more than 'identify."').
167. See, e.g., R.M. Goode, The Right To Trace and Its Impact i Commercial
Transactions-I,92 L.Q. REv. 360, 370 (1976) ("[T]he right to follow denotes a right to trace
the asset into a changed form...."); Williston, supra note 146, at 30 (referencing the "right
the cestui que trust always has, even though he may also be able to follow his money into a
certain investment"); see also supranote 148 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
169. See, e.g., Oesterle, supra note 43, at 174 ("The plaintiff bears the burden of
proving any transactional link between the misappropriated property and the property found
in the defendant's hands."). But cf Simon Evans, Rethinking Tracing and the Law of
Restitution, 115 L.Q. RFv. 469 (1999) (challenging the need for tracing to involve a
transactional link between the initial and surviving enrichment).
170. See supra notes 150-154 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 159-161 and accompanying text.
172. This is in contrast to the rights-based conception of tracing advanced by many
commentators. See, e.g., Oesterle, supra note 43, at 173 (defining tracing as a "restitutionary
right to claim specific property... that arises from a property interest of the claimant in other
property that another has misappropriated"); see also supra note 155 and accompanying text.
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rules that determine whether certain value in a wrongdoer's hands is
derivative of misappropriated value, and thus subject to a justifiable
legal claim. 3 Significantly, unlike competing conceptions, rulesbased tracing focuses on value, rather than specific assets or property.
This property reflects tracing's fundamental concern for situations
where a substitution of misappropriated assets or property for other
assets or property has occurred:
The only connection which the plaintiff has to the new thing is that it
was acquired with the original thing.... What is traced, then, is the
value inherent in things. It is value,not property or assets, which can be
identified in different forms after each substitution. The grammatical
object of 'to trace' is 'value."'74
This is because no other component of tracing purely captures the
illicitness that the process seeks to remedy. Certainly, there is no
principled basis in focusing on the actual exchange between the
wrongdoer and an innocent third party, as that act can be legal. 5 And
there is no principled basis in focusing on the specific path of the
property or assets, either of the misappropriated or substituted sort.
On the one hand, the path of the misappropriated property or assets
simply diverts the inquiry to an innocent third party that is equal to the
victim in the eyes of tracing. 6 On the other hand, the path of
substituted property or assets does lead to the wrongdoer, but without
any evidence of the actual wrongdoing.'

173. See GOODE, supra note 151, § 1 I(ii), at 53 ("[T]racing is ...merely a legal
mechanism to establish that a benefit received by the defendant can be identified as resulting
from a diminution in the plaintiff's assets."); SMITH, supm note 43, at 6 ("Tracing identifies a
new thing as the potential subject matter of a claim, on the basis that it is the substitute for an
original thing which was itself the subject matter of a claim.").
174. SMITH, supra note 43, at 15.
175. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. Moreover, the form of the exchange
need not be the same for tracing to apply. See, e.g., GOODE, supra note 151, § I 1(), at 53
("[A]n improper transfer of value by novation is just as traceable as a transfer of value by
assignment.").
176. See supranote 155 and accompanying text.
177. The substituted property's path may not even end up involving the wrongdoer, as
tracing still applies when the substituted property is in the custody of an intermediary or a
fourth party. Moreover, value can encompass scenarios in which the wrongdoer possesses
both misappropriated and substituted property; one such instance involves a company that
redeems outstanding debt through the issuance of stock or proceeds from lower cost debt.
See, c.g., Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 570 E Supp. 1529 (S.D.N.Y
1983) (denying injunctive relief against such redemption even in light of a prohibitory clause
in an indenture). Borrowing companies can avoid this question altogether simply by entering
into an interest rate swap agreement while issuing debt. I thank Lawrence A. Cunningham
for this point.
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Value properly orients the tracing inquiry. Fundamentally, value
is what the wrongdoer has misappropriated from the victim. Value is
also a sufficiently abstract notion to accommodate the shift to
substituted property that the victim seeks to claim.'78 As one
commentator has observed, the notion of value eliminates the "need to
show any physical correlation between the asset the plaintiff lost and
the asset the defendant received."'79 Equally important, value "inheres

in rights, where they are rights in tangible things or not" and thus
"simply reifies that which inheres in an asset.""'8 In this way, value
also serves as a principled basis for the victim's claim.' 8'
Reconceptualizing the method in this way clarifies two
analytically distinct processes that are often conflated with tracing
itself.'82 The first process is what Professor Smith denotes "following."
This is an entirely factual and mechanical exercise of locating the
misappropriated value that originally belonged to the victim; following
"is not a claim or a right in itself.... By itself, it does not make
anyone liable."' 83' Liability is the domain of the second process, what

178. See SMITH, supra note 43, at 119 ("[Value] is the only constant that exists before,
through, and after the substitution through which we trace. It exists in a different form after
the substitution, and that is what can justify a claim to the new asset."). Another way to
conceptualize value is as a category enabling different assets or property to become fungible.
See, e.g., Goode, supranote 167, at 383 ("Fungibles are tangible assets of which one unit is,
in terms of an obligation owed by one party to another, indistinguishable from any other unit
...
This is.").not to say that the exchange between the wrongdoer and an innocent third
party consists of equivalent value. See id. at 157. Because the wrongdoer knowingly
provides misappropriated value, that may be or command less than what a legally acquired
value would on the market. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the
Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REv 1193, 1196 (1985) ("Since I am unwilling (because
unable-but it does not matter why) to pay [the original owner's] price for [the
misappropriated value], it follows that the [misappropriated value] would be less valuable in
an economic sense in my hands than in his.").
179. GOODE, supmanote 151, § 1 l(ii), at 53.
180. SMrrH, supm note 43, at 16.
181. Tracing does not by itself generate liability. See id. at 132; miua note 183 and
accompanying text.
182. The distinction between following, claiming, and tracing is not merely theoretical.
See, e.g., GOODE, supranote 151, § 1I(ii), at 53 ("These concepts have now been endorsed by
the highest authority.' (citing Foskett v. McKeown, [2001] 1 A.C. 102, 128 (H.L.) (appeal
taken from Eng.))). American courts implicitly make the same distinction. See, e.g., In re
United Cigar Stores Co. of Am., 70 F.2d 313, 316 (2d Cir. 1934) ("There can be no recovery
... where all that can be shown is enrichment of the trustee. Misappropriated trust property
must be clearly traced and identified in specific property.").
183. SMITH, supra note 43, at 10. According to Smith,
[t]he most salient difference between the exercise of tracing and the exercise of
following is that the latter can be exclusively factual. Following can involve no
more than the proof that a particular tangible thing was in a certain place at a
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Professor Smith denotes "claiming." This is a justificatory exercise of
determining whether liability attaches; claiming affords the victim
rights to value, of either the misappropriatedorsubstitutedsort.8
Although they can be stand-alone processes, following and
claiming overlap with the tracing process. The first step is to follow
the path of the misappropriated value from the victim to the
wrongdoer. At that point, the paths diverge.'85 On the one hand,
continuing the exercise of following would lead to an innocent third
party and an attempt to restore the original value back to the victim,
i.e., specific restitution.'86 On the other hand, abandoning the exercise
of following would lead to the exercise of claiming that substituted
value in the wrongdoer's custody is a legally unjustified benefit at the
victim's expense, i.e., unjust enrichment.'87 This latter step completes
the tracing exercise, which thus neither follows the misappropriated
value to its ultimate resting point nor claims that the substituted value
justifiably belongs to the victim.'88 All that concerns tracing is
recognizing substituted value.
C

DoctrinalMethods

The litmus test for any conception of remedial tracing is the
problem of commingled funds. As one commentator has observed,
"[ilt was at one time thought that once money had reached the hands
of a banker or broker, it was absolutely merged, not traceable, and so
not recoverable, whatever might be the claimant's rights against the
customer."'8 9 Unlike the basic tracing scenario involving an exchange
certain time. Tracing, on the other hand, always involves the application of legal
rules.
Id.at 11.
184. See, e.g., GOODE, supmnote 151, § 1 1(ii), at 53.
185. See, e.g., SMITH, supranote 43, at 8 ("Sometimes a plaintiff will want to conduct
both exercises, tracing and following.... Both exercises cannot ... be conducted in relation
to the same transaction, except of course as alternatives, because they are mutually
inconsistent.").
186. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
188. But see, e.g., 2 DOBBS, supra note 157, § 6.1(3), at 11 ("The purpose of
constructive trust, equitable lien and even subrogation, is to require restitution to prevent
unjust enrichment.").
189.

MARK HAPGOOD, PAGET'S LAW OF BANKING 85 (11 th ed. 1996). Indeed, many

civil law commentators maintain:
The common law will not trace through a mixed fund.... In other words, at
common law the question whether anything survives in your hands becomes a
question whether there is anything which you hold as the result of one or more
clean substitutions, without adding outside funds to those originally received.
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of value between a wrongdoer and a third party, commingled funds
introduce another wrinkle. Commingling enables the wrongdoer to
substitute fungible value,"' or more cynically, to launder money." '
Courts have devised a myriad of rules for tracing commingled
funds. The elementary case involves a bank account that contains a
fixed amount of the wrongdoer's own value and the misappropriated
value. In this case, the victim can claim the full amount of the
traceable misappropriated value,"' even if the wrongdoer deposits
additional value into the commingled fund. 93
The intermediate case involves a commingled bank account from
which the wrongdoer has withdrawn value. The dominant approach is
to employ a patipassurule. 94 Courts award the victim a proportionate
BIRKS, supra note 45, at 359. But see, e.g., SMITH, supra note 43, at 162-74, 174 (challenging
this view, as part of a broader conception of tracing that does not abide by the distinction
between equity and law, because "[t]he rules of tracing tell us when an asset counts as the
substitute for or proceeds of another asset"); supranotes 150-154 and accompanying text.
190. See, e.g., SMrrH, supra note 43, at 161-62 ("This situation has multiple inputs,
and multiple outputs as well. It is impossible definitively to ascribe the value being traced to
either of the outputs."). The wrongdoer need not be entitled to the additional source of value,
as it may come from another illicit transaction.
191. See generally Stephen Moriarty, Tracing, AlKing and Laundeing, in BIRKs,
supra note 150, at 73.
192. See, e.g., 2 DOBBS, supra note 157, § 6.1(4), at 16 ("In the simplest situation...
[t]he plaintiff is entitled to a lien on the commingled fund in the amount of his own monies
traced to it."); HAPGOOD, supra note 189, at 86 ("So long as money is traceable either in
specie or in its proceeds or investment, equity.., will follow and lay hold of it, under what is
known as a tracing order .... ). The wrongdoer bears the burden of proving that certain
commingled value does not belong to the victim; interestingly, this permits a startling
possibility in which the victim could claim all of the value in a commingled fund when the
wrongdoer fails to meet the applicable burden. See 2 DOBBS, supra note 157, § 6.1(4), at 16
n.3 (citing Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251 (1916); Republic
Supply Co. of Cal. v. Richfield Oil Co. of Cal., 79 E2d 375 (9th Cir. 1935)). This would
seem to be an impermissible extraction of the claiming process within rules-based tracing.
See supra note 187 and accompanying text. In any event, this scenario is not possible under
the Securities Act, which caps the amount recoverable by a security holder to the amount of
the offering price and, in the case of section 11, the total award to the aggregate offering yield.
See supranote 79 and accompanying text.
193. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION QUASI CONTRACTS AND
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS § 215, cmt. c (1937) ("Although subsequent additions of cash from

other sources increase the amount of the fund on which the claimant has a lien, they do not
increase the amount he is entitled to receive from the fund."); see also 2 DOBBS, supra note
157, § 6.1(4), at 16 n.2 ("If the fund has grown by the deposit of unidentified funds, there
seems no reason to give the plaintiff a proportionate share of the fund."). This is distinct from
the situation where the value within the commingled fund appreciates. See infa notes 199200 and accompanying text.
194. In re Diplock, 1 Ch. 465 (1948), is the first notable case in which courts applied
this rule. An alternate rule used within civil jurisdictions is known as "First In, First Out,"
which deems the source of the first deposit into an active commingled account as the source
of the first withdrawal. See, e.g., Clayton's Case, 35 Eng. Rep. 781 (1816). Because of the
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interest in the wrongdoer's bank account at the time it becomes
commingled with the misappropriated value. When the wrongdoer
only withdraws funds from the bank account, the victim maintains a
claim to a proportionate interest in the remaining traceable value.'"
When, however, the wrongdoer has withdrawn and also deposited
value within the bank account, courts use what is known as the
"Lowest Intermediate Balance" rule;'96 because there are multiple
possible sources of value,' the victim can claim only up to the lowest
balance between the time of the wrongdoer's deposit and tracing.9
The difficult case involves a commingled bank account that has
appreciated in value. In this case, the value may have increased
through any number of ways, such as investment or interest. Some
contend that the victim should be entitled to no more than the traceable
misappropriated value.'99 Others instead advocate a par passu
approach, whereby the victim is entitled to claim a proportionate
interest in the appreciated commingled value.2"
None of these rules, however, represents a principled approach to
commingled funds as rules-based tracing does. According to Dan
Dobbs, "every one of the methods for tracing commingled funds can
difficulty associated with proving the source of the first deposit, some courts proceeded to
deem the first withdrawal to be presumptively from the wrongdoer's value, regardless of the
order of deposits. See, e.g., In re Hallett's Estate, 13 Ch.D. 696 (1879). But see, e.g., GOFF &
JONES, supra note 152, at 59.
195. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION: QUASI CONTRACTS AND
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS §§ 211-212; see also BIRKS, supra note 45, at 363 ("[Tlhe fund which
is held by the defendant is regarded at the moment of the mixing as containing both the
plaintiff's money and his own and then as depreciating in the same proportions as it was
originally constituted."). But see 1 GEORGE PALMER, LAW OF RESTITUTION §§ 2.16-2.17
(1978) (questioning the mechanics ofparpassuwhen the withdrawals are untraceable).
196. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Universal Ins. Co., 838 E2d 612 (1st Cir.
1988); In re Mahan & Rowsey, Inc., 817 E2d 682 (10th Cir. 1987); United States v. Bacno
Cafetero Pan., 797 E2d 1154 (2d Cir. 1986).
197. This includes not only value from the wrongdoer and the victim, but also from
another victim or an innocent third party. See, e.g., SMrH, supra note 43, at 201 ("[I]t is
impossible to say whether or not [a deposit of value] came from the plaintiff; the account is
an indistinguishable mixture of value; but this impossibility is resolved in her favour against a
wrongdoer.").
198. See, e.g., 2 DOBBS, supranote 157, § 6.1(4), at 22.
199. See, e.g., BIRKS, supra note 45, at 366 (citing dicta within In re Halletts Estate,
13 Ch.D. at 709, stating that "a fortorithat as against an innocent defendant the recipient can
only say that there survives, in the appreciated asset, the full value of the enrichment
originally received"). Birks rightfully notes, however, that this position "seems inconsistent
with the view expressed in relation to purchases from an unmixed fund," where the victim is
entitled to all of the wrongdoer's proceeds. Id
200. See, e.g., 2 DOBBS, supranote 157, § 6.1(4), at 16 n.2 ("[T]he plaintiff may have a
plausible claim not only for a lien to secure his losses, but for a share of the augmented fund
represented by the original ratio of his deposits to those of the defendant's.").
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present a problem on some set of facts.""2 ' The problem is that these
existing methods focus on assets or property in support of a legal
claim. In contrast, rules-based tracing focuses on value and does not
include the analytically distinct exercise of claiming.2 Under this
213
conception, "[a] mixed substitution creates a mixture of value.,
Rules-based tracing merely seeks to determine whether commingled
funds are a substitution, and thus a mixture, of value; this process
"does not entail that the plaintiff has any rights in the traceable
proceeds. ' '2 1 Commingling perforce involves fungible instruments,
typically money within a bank account. This fungibility is the linchpin
of any situation where misappropriated value is substituted with value
from the wrongdoer or some other party. Certainly, fungibility does
not entail substitution. But whenever a wrongdoer commingles
fungible instruments, they are either the original value that is the object
of following or substituted value that is the object of tracing. Because
portions of the following exercise are part of tracing, 25 commingled
funds are safely deemed traceable. Rules-based tracing, therefore,
encounters no peculiar difficulties with commingled funds.
V

INTRADISCIPLINARY TRACING

The previous Parts have navigated through the technical terrain of
securities and remedial law to map their respective conceptions of
tracing. Within each domain, tracing has received particularized
criticism. Explicit comparison between these conceptions, however,
allows remedial law to reveal the most serious problem with securities
law's conception of tracing: it is not actually tracing. Equally
troubling, it is not even a form of following. Security holders must
follow their purchase back to a fraudulent offering and yet never seek
specific restitution of these securities. Moreover, because of the bookentry system, these securities are fungible, and thus substitutable,
instruments ill-suited to following.
Rules-based tracing can rehabilitate securities law's tracing
requirement. The key is to abandon focus on the securities purchased,
and instead trace the value exchanged, that is, the money. This value is
201. Id §6.l(4),at25.
202. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. This is particularly appropriate
within the securities context, where the justification for liability is based on the Securities Act
and not the tracing requirement. See supm Part III.A.
203. SMITH, supmrnote 43, at 165.
204. Id.at 166.
205. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.

TULANE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 80:849

substituted via the wrongdoer's commingled bank account. And this
value is the benefit that a wrongdoer unjustifiably receives at the
security holder's expense. Rules-based tracing also comports with the
Securities Act in that the process directs security holders to claim the
statutory provision of monetary relief.
Rules-based tracing handles multiple offerings with relative ease.
This is accomplished by a simple designation system in which security
holders arbitrarily select an offering at the point of purchase. For the
purposes of asserting a claim, that selection will determine whether the
security holders exchanged value in connection with a fraudulent
offering. Designating offerings in this way will restore access private
civil relief to all security holders and deter fraud optimally. Further,
this approach to tracing is not only compatible with the SEC's "access
equals delivery" model, but can further its objectives. This Part's
intradisciplinary comparison thus yields a superior conceptual and
practical framework for rules-based tracing within securities law.
A.

Re-Tmacing

Remedial tracing has no true counterpart within securities law.
The latter's conception of tracing filters access to private civil relief
under the Securities Act based on what "such security" a person has
purchased."6 This factual inquiry examines a security only to
determine the link between a security holder and a fraudulent
offering." 7 To "trace" securities successfully means to conclude that an
inferable relationship exists between the fraud and the ultimate
purchase." 8
"Tracing" in securities law entails nothing more. Proof of the
causal link neither generates nor justifies any legal liability.'
The
source of liability are sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act,2'
and the justification comes from the Securities Act's express purpose
of adequate disclosure and implicit purpose of deterrence. 21 1 Proof of
206. See supra notes 113-114 and accompanying text.
207. See, e.g., In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 227 ER.D. 65, 117 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) ("Tracing may be established ... through proof of a direct chain of title from the
original offering to the ultimate owner....").
208. See supra Part II.C. This is entirely distinct from the presumption of reliance.
See supa notes 78, 82, and accompanying text.
209. Certainly, failure to establish the requisite causal link precludes access to private
civil remedies under the Securities Act. To understand tracing in this way, however, is to
commit the mistake of seeing the requirement as one of standing. See supra note 12 and
accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 72-74, 85, and accompanying text.
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the causal link does not even resolve the question of legal liability.
This is true even with respect to the strict liability provided under
section 11, which requires proof not only of the fraud, but also of the
defendant's direct role." 2
Put differently, the remedial counterpart to this securities doctrine
would seem to be following. The "tracing" requirement is simply a
mechanical exercise in which courts reconstruct the path of a security
from a public offering, through a centralized custodian, to a broker or
dealer, and then into the hands of a purchaser."3 The security is but a
proxy for the flow of misstatements or omissions within a public
Correspondingly, "tracing" here involves no real
offering.21'
substitution of the security. 5 On the contrary, to "trace" successfully
requires proof that the security from the disputed public offering has
not been substituted in any way;. 6 that is, the purchaser must perform
the complete following exercise, which is "mutually inconsistent" with
tracing."7 Indeed, the only actual substitution involves the requested
relief; both sections 11 and 12(a)(2) do not award relief in the form of
the security, but rather its offering price. 8 Courts, therefore, require
purchasers to "follow" securities and yet "substitute" their claim.
Securities law instead should trace the value exchanged and then
substituted. The existing method curiously takes the vantage point of
the wrongdoer, and follows its direct connection to a security into the
purchaser's hands. 9 This inverts and distorts the proper orientation
that rules-based tracing takes, which is the value derived from
2
In the context of securities, this value is the
misappropriation.1
purchase money. Rather than focusing on the wrongdoer, this inquiry
begins with the object of relief, the security holder. One need go no
212. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 110, 187-188, and accompanying text.
214. See supra Part I.C.
215. When there is only one public offering, there is still "substitution" of the security
in the limited sense that it is fungible with all other like securities via the book-entry system.
One, however, does not purchase a "specific" security in the aftermarket and, thus, one
cannot know even the original thing that is "substituted" through a clearing corporation.
Moreover, this notion of substitution is merely one of form, and not of value, and thus not
relevant for the purposes of tracing. See SMrri, supra note 43, at 15; see also supra notes
174-181 and accompanying text.
216. See supranotes 26-27 and accompanying text; supraPart I.C.
217. See supra note 185.
218. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(e), 77k(g), 7742) (2000). This is not to say that the
substitution in relief is improper. This, however, merely reinforces the fact that liability, and
thus claiming, exclusively come from the Securities Act and its rationales.
219. See supra notes 28-33, 127, and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 174, 185-187, and accompanying text.

TULANE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 80:849

further than the Securities Act to see the primacy accorded to
protecting the security holder, and thus why it should be the initial
vantage point.'
And to the extent that courts follow anything, it
should not be the security, but the money. Beyond the fact that the
statutory relief comes in the form of money,222 this is the
misappropriated
value that following should seek to locate and then
223
restore.
But following the security holder's misappropriated value neither
entails a substitution nor generates any liability. Rules-based tracing is
a process whereby courts determine whether certain substituted value
within the wrongdoer's possession is derivative of the victim's original
value, and thus is subject to a legal claim.2 2 4 The misappropriated

value-the security holder's money-almost invariably ends up
commingled in the wrongdoer's bank account."5 In a semantic sense,
this money has changed into equity for the defendant. In a more
substantive sense, the original value has merged with other value,
either from other innocent parties or the wrongdoer, into a fungible
mass available for separate transactions; this commingling perforce
interchanges value, and thus involves a substitution that can only be
traced. 26
And focusing on the substituted value supplies the particular
form of relief provided by the Securities Act. Misappropriating
original value constitutes an unjustified benefit that a section 11 or
12(a)(2) defendant obtains at the security holder's expense; this is a

221. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text. This is compatible with a
deterrence rationale for sections 11 and 12(a)(2), pursuant to which ex post awards to
aggrieved security holders are justified in their provision of ex ante protection to future
security holders. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. The wrongdoer is relevant only
to the extent that the relief provides incentives to prevent further claims by security holders.
222. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(e), 77/2).
223. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 173 and accompanying text. Like following, however, rules-based
tracing does not generate liability, which is the subject of claiming. See, e.g., SMITH, supra
note 43, at 132.
225. This could be any one of the many classes of defendants subject to section 11 or
12(a)(2) liability. Conceivably, such defendant might deposit the security holder's money into
a separate account that experiences no other deposits or withdrawals. This, however, would
devolve into a following exercise. If there are separate deposits or withdrawals, the same
tracing principle would apply. To the extent this does not comport literally with rules-based
tracing, courts likely would not exalt form over substance. See, e.g.,
Barnes' Lessee v. Irwin,
2 DalI. 199, 203 (Pa. 1793) ("The substance, and not the form, ought principally to be
regarded*").
226. Accordingly, even if one wanted to follow the original value, completing the
exercise would be virtually impossible whenever a commingled bank account is involved.
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paradigmatic case of unjust enrichment.227 Indeed, this is what sections
11 and 12(a)(2) contemplate by providing claims "either at law or in
equity."28 Further, the substituted value is the specific object of the
security holder's claim. Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) both award monetary
229
relief based on, respectively, the "amount paid for the security' and
23°
the "consideration paid for such security," without requiring that this
be the purchaser's actual misappropriated value.
Rules-based tracing of money represents a principled and
justified way to restore access to private civil relief under the Securities
Act. The first step is to establish the transfer of the security holder's
money to the defendant, as evidenced by a confirmation of sale or
some other form of receipt. The next step is to establish the merger or
conversion of the security holder's money by the defendant with other
value, as inferred from a deposit into a bank account containing value
from either the wrongdoer or another party.2 31 Upon completing these
steps, the security holder can seek to invoke unjust enrichment as a
basis for a claim under section 11 or 12(a)(2).
None of this guarantees that a security holder will obtain relief.
Beyond the admittedly lax requirements of the first two steps, a
security holder must satisfy the elements of unjust enrichment to have
avail to a claim. A court, therefore, must determine that there has been
no breach of an independent duty and that the benefit to the defendant
Moreover,
clearly exceeds the losses to the security holder.23
a security
entitles
only
exercise
completing the rules-based tracing
holder access to private civil relief. A security holder still must
establish a prima facie case under section 11 or 12(a)(2). For section
11 this involves proof of the defendant's direct role in an offering and
its fraudulent character.2 3 For section 12(a)(2), in addition to the

227. See supranote 161 and accompanying text.
228. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a), 77/(2) (2000).
229. Section 11 provides a formula for deducting from this "amount paid," with a cap
based on the offering price. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. Notably, one of the
deductions involves "the value thereof as of the time such suit was brought." 15 U.S.C.
§ 77/e) (emphasis added).
230. 15 U.S.C. § 77A2).
231. Additional value from the security holder would require only a following
exercise. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
232. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION: QUASI CONTRACTS AND
CONSTRUCTrvETRUSTS § 1 (1937).
233. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, defendants

TracingMulple Offenngs

Rules-based tracing of securities provides a significant benefit,
however, that the existing requirement cannot. The existence of the
book-entry system and its centralized custodial structure effectively
necessitates discrimination between various classes of security
holders."6 Regardless of the method used, only Class I security holders
have any assurance of claiming private civil relief under the Securities
Act."7 Through inferential reasoning, this assurance extends to Class
II, and arguably some Class III, security holders when there is only one
offering.238 This assurance evaporates, however, when there are
multiple offerings; at best Class II security holders have uncertain
access to section !1 or 12(a)(2), and, at worst, Class IH security
holders have no access whatsoever."'
As a result, there is a
considerable incentive to conduct multiple offerings to avoid
substantial liability under the Securities Act.
The way to combat this incentive is resort to intradisciplinary
tracing. One possibility is the Fungible Mass Method derived from the
toxic tort context.24" The method originated as a way to deal with the
problem of indeterminate plaintiffs that cannot pinpoint the source of
their injury. 4t To solve this problem, courts have permitted the use of
statistical evidence to establish that exposure to a particular substance
was more probably the specific cause of the injury than other
background factors. 42 Adapted to the securities context, courts would
apply a preponderance of the evidence standard to all security
holders.2 3 Provided there is a greater than fifty percent probability that
234. See supm note 83 and accompanying text.
235. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(b), 77(2).
236. See supraPart II.B-C.
237. See supm notes 3 1-32, 121, and accompanying text.
238. See supranotes 33-34 and accompanying text.
239. See supraPart II.C.
240. See supranotes 133-136 and accompanying text.
241. See Sale, supra note 19, at 486 & n.361 (analyzing causation issues within In re
'Agent Orange"ProductLiability Litigation,597 E Supp. 740, 833-35 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), and
noting that the problem also plagues insider trading claims within securities law).
242. See Sale, supra note 19, at 486-87 & n.363 ("Many ...courts have considered
this problem in various toxic-substance contexts and have permitted proof of causation
through statistically based evidence.") (citing cases).
243. See, e.g., Kirkwood v. Taylor, 590 E Supp. 1375, 1378-79 (D. Minn. 1984), affI
760 F.2d 272 (8th Cir. 1985) (unpublished table decision).
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a given purchase was from an offering involving material
misstatements or omissions, " the total number of offerings involved
would be irrelevant, and any security holder could satisfy the existing
tracing requirement.245
Hillary Sale has argued forcefully in favor of using this method
instead of the prevailing Direct Tracing approach." 6 The Fungible
Mass Method now enjoys sufficient currency within torts law that
allays early judicial apprehension within securities law. 47 Further, the
method comports not only with sections 11 and 12(a)(2), 248 but also the

Securities Act's express purpose.2 ' And, perhaps most significantly,
the method provides Class II and III security holders more assured
access to private civil relief.25°
This access, however, would not always be available. The
Fungible Mass Method requires statistical proof that a majority of the
shares are from a fraudulent offering. The method's flip-side, then, is
that security holders would have no access to relief when a majority of
244.

Cf WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMIENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *358

(quantifying reasonable doubt as tolerating a ten percent error rate); Lawrence M. Solan,
Refocusing the Burden of Proofin Crminal Cases. Some DoubtAboutReasonable Doubt,
78 TEx. L. REv. 105, 126 (1999) ("Our courts do not use jury instructions based on
percentages of certainty, and I do not suggest here that they begin doing so."). This
implicates voluminous evidentiary literature concerning proof paradoxes and Bayesian
formulations that cannot be addressed reasonably here. See generallyL. JONATHAN COHEN,
THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE (1977) (discussing Proof Paradoxes); Richard 0. Lempert,
Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REV 1021 (1977) (discussing Bayesian Formulation).
245. See Sale, supra note 19, at 488 ("[R]egardless of when they bought their shares,
all of the shareholders would be Offering Shareholders and should have access to the
remedies of sections 11 and 12(a)(2).").
246. Seeid at 483-93.
247. See id.at 485 ("[A]cceptance of [statistically derived-proof] has gained
ascendancy in all types of civil litigation and can be used for proof of traceability here."
(internal citation omitted)). This development directly addresses a reason cited by a court that
considered, and then rejected, the Fungible Mass Method. See Inre Elscint, Ltd. Sec. Litig.,
674 E Supp. 374, 381 (D. Mass 1987). Sale's proposal thus builds upon a method that courts
already have recognized within the securities context. I see no reason, however, why courts
should be any more reluctant to embrace another intradisciplinary method that enjoys
currency within the remedial context and is actually a theoretically correct conception of
tracing.
248. See Sale, supra note 19, at 489-93 (establishing the method's compatibility with
various restrictive aspects of both provisions, such as the one-year statute of limitations,
liability caps, and strike suit guards).
at 493 ("[Tlhe use of statistics ... would help to force defendants to take
249. See id.
seriously their statutory due-diligence responsibilities to deter misstatements and
omissions-the reason Congress created such stringent provisions as sections 11 and 12(a)(2)
in the first place.").
250. See id at 488-89 ("[S]tatistically derived proof solves the problem of
shareholders who purchase Offering Shares in the Aftermarket and are, therefore, unable to
meet the direct tracing requirement.").
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the shares are from a nonfraudulent offering.25 ' Accordingly, the
method still generates a perverse incentive. Sections 11 and 12(a)(2)
defendants can use a nonfraudulent offering to eliminate or undo their
liability for a previous fraudulent offering. 252 Alternatively, one could
preempt any risk of liability by splitting an originally planned offering
into two offerings of equal amounts of securities, only one of which
involves fraud. The Fungible Mass Method thus provides a solution to
the tracing requirement, but suffers from the same current evasion
strategy.
Rules-based tracing can eliminate this problem. All that would
be necessary with multiple offerings is to give security holders a
choice. At the point of purchase, a security holder would designate an
offering to be connected with the value provided. That designation
would be recorded by the central depository or issuer, contemporaneous with the purchase. The total number of designations possible
would be tied to the number of securities offered. Akin to the rule
courts currently apply,253 designations would operate on a "First-Come,
First-In" basis; once all securities in a particular offering are
designated, that option would disappear and the process would
continue until all such designations of offerings were complete.25'
Security holders would be permitted only to trace, and then claim,
value for designated offerings.
Designations would present no logistical problems.
The
electronic system currently in place for clearing and settling trades
easily could handle recordation of designations. Further, this task
would be only a slight imposition for brokers or dealers that already
must handle transactions. Accordingly, the systemic and transaction
costs of implementing this right-based tracing system would be
minimal. At the same time, the designations would provide clear
evidence, and thus conserve judicial resources that the existing tracing
inquiry does, or the Fungible Mass Method would, expend."'
251. See id.
at 489 ("[A]ny time the percentage of later Offering Shares exceeds those
in the earlier, disputed offering, the plaintiffs will not succeed with their statistically based
evidence.").
252. See, e.g., supm note 36 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
254. As with other methods, this designation scheme would be unnecessary when
there is only one offering, as all those securities are already traceable. See supm note 130 and
accompanying text.
255. Cf Linda J. Candler, Tmcing and Recovering Proceeds of Crime in Fmud Cases:
A Comparisonof US and UK.
Legislation, 31 INT'L LAw. 3, 4 (1997) ("In [numerous] cases,
tracing the assets and recovering the proceeds of the fraud have proved to be difficult, timeconsuming, and expensive.")
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Further, designations would present no legal difficulties. The fact
that security holders necessarily must choose an offering without
knowing ex ante which designation will lead to a claim is entirely
consistent with sections 11 and 12(a)(2)'s bar on security holders
purchasing while knowing of fraud. 26

And because the number of

designations and securities offered are linked, the cap on damages to
offering price would ensure that the257 maximum aggregate liability

would comply with the statutory limit.

Moreover, the limit on designations effectively addresses any
policy concerns about the accuracy of relief. On the one hand, the
class of claimants may be overinclusive. Certainly there will be some
security holders that will choose an offering actually unconnected with
the exchanged value;258 and some security holders will be able to make
a claim even though they exchanged value in connection with a
nonfraudulent offering. 9 On the other hand, the class of claimants
may be underinclusive. There will be other security holders that will
not be able to choose the offering actually connected with their
exchanged value; and some security holders will not be able to make a
claim even though they exchanged value in connection with a
fraudulent offering. 6 '
256. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a), 77A2) (2000).
257. Seeid §§ 77k(e), 77/(2).
258. Courts historically have viewed this concern as one of legal causation. See, e.g.,
Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 E2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967). As demonstrated earlier, such a view is
premised on a conception of tracing that is actually following. See supra notes 213-218 and
accompanying text. Rules-based tracing, however, is not concerned with the connection
between misappropriated value and a fraudulent offering. See supra notes 219-223 and
accompanying text.
259. SeeSale, supranote 19, at 489-91.
260. Security holders can avoid this result by simply purchasing at least two shares and
hedging their designations on different offerings. A modest consequence of such rational
hedging might be that shares from different offerings will trade at different prices,
particularly in response to one offering being barred by the statute of limitations and in
situations where the company has a less than pristine reputation. A more cynical
consequence might be the emergence of a secondary postpurchase market in which security
holders trade their designations about which offerings might involve material misstatements
or omissions. I thank Tung Yin for raising these points.
Both possible consequences present the same basic problem of variances between
different designated shares, either for the same company or between separate companies. As
a preliminary matter, these variances can be accounted for and justified by the Efficient
Capital Markets Hypothesis. Moreover, the market would be limited by the one-year statute
of limitations running from the posteffective date. And, in any event, these secondary claims
likely would not generate any additional liability; because the designation scheme eliminates
any uncertainty in claiming, any security holder that had designated a fraudulent offering
likely would assert a claim. Finally, as the aggregate recovery cap limits the number of
permissible claims, courts simply could look at the records for security holders that had made
initial designations and prefer their claims.
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While there is no guarantee that these different groups will be
symmetrical, and thus offset each other,26 ' the amount of relief
certainly will be accurate. From the standpoint of a sections 11 or
12(a)(2) defendant, the limit on the number of designations ensures
that the liability will not exceed the capped offering price." ' To the
extent that sections 11 and 12(a)(2) seek to deter, rather than
compensate,"3 these designations would achieve a superior result than
any of the existing methods.2" Indeed, these designations theoretically
should produce the optimal amount of desired deterrence
contemplated by statute.
At the same time, the designations employ an egalitarian
approach to all classes of security holders. Unlike existing approaches
that follow securities, the designation system is based on the value
exchanged. This is manifest in how security holders would select an
offering at the time of purchase, which is when an exchange of value
occurs. Class I security holders effectively will experience no
difference under this scheme, as they will have the first opportunity to
make a designation. And unless Class I security holders purchase the
entire offering, Class II and III security holders also will have an
opportunity to make a designation. This is because the capacity to
designate, and thus seek a claim, would turn on not a security holder's
access, but the relationship between the value exchanged and the
number of securities offered."5 Rules-based tracing thus eschews the
need to make "arbitrary distinctions" between security holders.2"
Instead, the market for purchasing securities would govern the capacity
to seek private civil relief under the Securities Act.
C

Value EqualsAccessEqualsDelivery

The SEC's "access equals delivery" model is remarkably
compatible with the rules-based tracing scheme proposed here. The
model strives to streamline the procedures for effecting delivery of a
261. But cf RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION:
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS § 1 cmt. d (1937) ("Ordinarily the benefit

QUASI CONTRACTS AND

to the one and the loss to
the other are co-extensive, and the result... [will be] to make restitution to the other for the
loss which he has suffered.").
262. Seeid §§ 77k(e), 77A(2).
263.

See supm note 85 and accompanying text.

264. As Sale has noted, "[tihe most important argument ... is that without a new way
to prove tracing, the mechanism to enforce the recovery rights of [Class II and III security
holders] is eliminated." Sale, supra note 19, at 491.
265.
266.

See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
InreInitial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 227 ER.D. 65, 118 (S.D.N.Y 2004).
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final prospectus without compromising investor confidence about their
participation in a registered offering." 7 The additional notification
provision cuts against this objective. The provision effectively requires
delivery of a notice by a "well-known seasoned issuer" in lieu of the
final prospectus delivery requirement that the model seeks to relax.
To be sure, this notification requirement is necessary to protect
investors. Notice performs a valuable function in confirming that a
purchase was part of a registered transaction. This reassures investors
of their access to certain private civil remedies in the event that the
offering turns out to be fraudulent.2 68

Whether deliberate or not,

however, the SEC no longer explicitly bases the need for notice on "an
investor's ability to trace securities.'2 69 Certainly this ability has
deteriorated at the hands of the book-entry system and judicial
formulations of the "tracing" requirement.27 As a result, while
delivery of a final prospectus can be effected through online access,
security holders no longer have reliable access to private civil remedies
under the Securities Act.
Rules-based tracing would obviate the need for a notification
requirement. Tellingly, the notification requirement does not revolve
around the path of the security, but rather the transactional status of the
Similarly, designating an
purchase, that is, the exchange of value.'
offering at the point of purchase enables security holders to later trace
the exchange, and subsequent substitution, of misappropriated value.
This scheme thus would reassure all initial participants in a "wellknown seasoned issuer's" offering that they will be capable of seeking
relief through section 11 or 12(a)(2). Such reassurance is what the
notification requirement presumably seeks to provide.

267. See supr-d notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
268. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
270. See supa Parts I.B-C. Under the "access equals delivery" model, security
holders still receive a confirmation of sale and subsequently can request a copy of the final
prospectus. See Securities Offering Reform, 40 C.ER. pts. 228-29, 230, 239-40, 243, and
274. Because issuers eligible for the "access equals delivery" model must be relatively
there is a limited need for reassurance that rules-based
established and reliable, see id.,
tracing can satisfy. For other issuers, rules-based tracing would not supplant existing final
prospectus and notification requirements.
271. See supra notes 224-226 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 254-264 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

Tracing is a method that appears within multiple fields of law.
25

27
2
Courts frequently trace in agency, 7 antitrust, 4 bankruptcy,
1
27
2
276
0 property,2
family,28perhaps
' elderly,17
criminal,
commercial,
tax,282 and tort 3contract,
matters. 7 These
applications
are matched
only

273. See, e.g., HAPGOOD, supra note 189, at 372 ("A fundamental condition for
property to be traced in equity is the existence of an equitable relationship."). But cf supra
note 152 and accompanying text.
274. See, e.g., Amy A. Marasco, Note, Tracing an Antitrust Injuryin SecondaryLine
Price DiscriminationCases, 50 FORDHAM L. REv. 909, 928 (1982) ("[C]ourts have taken a
stricter approach to the concept of tracing and have allowed damages only when it has been
clear that the injury did not result from any form of legitimate competition or the plaintiff's
own inadequacies.").
275. See, e.g., Steve H. Nickles & Edward S. Adams, TracingProceeds to Attorneys'
Pockets (and the Dilemma of Pay4ng for Bankruptcy), 78 MrNN. L. REV. 1079, 1104-05
(1994) ("When the debtor commingles proceeds with non-proceeds, courts employ a fictional
tracing method known as the lowest intermediate balance rule, derived from the Restatement
(Second)of Trusts.").
276. See, e.g., Richard L. Barnes, Tracing Commingled Proceeds:
The
MetamorphosisofEquiyPrinciplesinto UC.C Doctrine,51 U. PITT. L. REv. 281,282 (1990)
("In creating [a] principle of attribution, the drafters of [U.C.C.] section 9-306 ... borrowed
tracing rules from the laws of trusts, equity and restitution and infused Article Nine with
them.").
277. See, e.g., Matthews v. Crowder, 69 S.W 779, 780 (Tenn. 1902) ("[T]he
supplementary subjection ... results from ... the doctrine that a cestui que trust may follow
the trust fund wherever he may be able to trace it, except in the hands of innocent third
persons.").
278. See, e.g., Newton v. Porter, 69 N.Y. 133, 136 (N.Y. 1877) ("[T]he owner of
negotiable securities stolen and afterwards sold by the thief may pursue the proceeds of the
sale in the hands of the felonious taker or his assignee with notice, through whatever changes
the proceeds may have gone, so long as the proceeds or the substitute therefor [sic] can be
distinguished and identified... ).
279. See, e.g., Janel C. Frank, Note, How FarIs Too Far? TracingAssets in Medicaid
Estate Recovery, 79 N.D. L. REV. 111, 144 (2003) ("Most states have interpreted [the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act] as allowing them to trace and recover assets that were
once owned by the recipient spouse from the estate of the surviving spouse.").
280. See, e.g., J. Thomas Oldham, Tracing, Commingling,andTransmutation,23 FAM.
L.Q. 219, 223-24 (1989) ("[T]o establish a separate property claim to funds in existence at
the time of divorce, a spouse must be able to trace such funds to separate property.").
281. See, e.g., ANDREw P. BELL, MODERN LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY IN ENGLAND
AND IRELAND 462 (1989) ("The law of tracing embraces ... rules relating to the situation

where the subject-matter of an interest has been disposed of or has undergone some change
of form or mixing with other property.").
282. See, e.g., Alfred D. Youngwood & Christina M. Cerrito, Tracing PropertyAfler
Its "Owner"Changes Sections 337, 704(c)(1), 737, 751, 382, 384, 1031, and 1374, 51 TAX
LAW. 511, 512 (1998) ("Congress has chosen to track the property movements in certain of
these business arrangements... to prevent income or basis shifting among parties who might
have the incentives and ability to do so?').
283. See, e.g., James Leonard, Ubi Remedium Ibi Jus, Or, Where There? a Remedy,
Therel a Right: A SkepticsAT Critique of Ex Parte Young, 54 SYRACUSE L. REv. 215, 245
n.230 (2004) ("Nineteenth century equity courts developed presumptions that permitted
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by the multiplicity of names tracing has assumed over the years., 4
More significantly, an absence of dialogue between legal domains has
spawned different conceptions of tracing within securities and
remedial law that engender radically divergent results. In securities
law, tracing deprives security holders of private civil relief, whereas in
remedial law, tracing provides restitutionary relief to victims deprived
of their value.
Undoubtedly, these inverted conceptions of tracing are the
product of unconscious accident, and not premeditated design. As one
commentator has observed, "[w]ere symmetrical categories and
doctrines joined, courts would have no trouble spotting their intraconnection; it is only when the Siamese-doctrines are severed that they
may wander off in different directions."285
The principal difficulty, however, lies not in spotting these "intraconnections," but rather in convincing the law to use them. Centuries
of remedial tracing jurisprudence stand ready for courts to reconsider
the securities tracing requirement. All courts need to do is acknowledge
the value of money
2

tracing of monies that had been illegally deposited in the tortfeasor's bank account and
commingled with other funds.") (citing cases).
284. See supm notes 165-169 and accompanying text.
285. Hirsch, supr note 66, at 1154.

